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ABSTRACT 
RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN CRISIS:  AN ANALYSIS OF IMAGE RESTORATION 
STRATEGIES AND CONTINGENT VARIABLES 
by Melody Teracita Fisher 
December 2012 
 The following study employs content analysis to examine the crisis 
communication responses and audience reception of religious leaders involved in 
scandal. Benoit’s Image Repair Strategies and the Contingency Theory are used to 
determine the strategies, stances and contingent variables of mega-church leaders:  Jim 
Bakker, Ted Haggard, Eddie Long, Henry Lyons and Jimmy Swaggart; and the Boston 
Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church.  News framing theory determined media and 
audience reception of the religious leaders’ crisis communication responses. 
 The study concludes that there is little difference in mega-church leaders and the 
Boston Diocese’s crisis communication responses.  Religious leaders’ dominant 
strategies were bolstering and denial, and their media portrayals were balanced.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Catholic Church and several Protestant churches have come under public 
scrutiny because of their leaders’ presumed immoral, and sometimes criminal, behavior - 
both alleged and admitted.  Religious leaders have been tried in the court of public 
opinion on issues ranging from financial embezzlement to sexual abuse (Panichas, 2002). 
Before the allegations were released, many of these leaders enjoyed opulent lifestyles, 
political astuteness, and sterling reputations among their congregants. Many of these men 
were revered in their local communities as well as on a national level. 
 The majority of the leaders were accused of scandalous activity.  The victims, co-
conspirator, or someone privy to the act(s) revealed the damaging information for 
individual reasons ranging from citizen justice to malice. Other times leaders admitted 
guilt to their respective publics in effort to clear their conscience. After these disgraces 
are publically announced, the leaders’ images suddenly become tainted and individual 
campaigns to restore their positive public image are executed. Image restoration 
strategies are practiced in effort to combat moral dilemmas and regain the trust of 
respective congregations. To defend themselves from accusations and suspicion, leaders 
have spoken publically to their specific congregations and to the world through various 
forms of public relations tactics.  Sermons, press conferences, and interviews have been 
the most frequently used ways for embattled pastors to reclaim their prevalent voice in 
the religious world.  These tactics are a departure from normal religious public relations 
practices.  Religious public relations practitioners primarily use the two-way symmetrical 
role (Cannon, 2011).  Several religious communicators agreed that they used 
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“communication to build two-way understanding, mediate conflicts between 
organizations and publics, and let publics influence the organization as much as it 
influences them” (p. 32).  This model of public relations has been touted because it 
encourages a dialogue between the organization and its publics (Grunig, 2001). 
The press agentry/publicity model is also widely practiced in religious institutions 
(Badaracco, 2006).  In effort to disseminate information to parishioners and the general 
public, publicity is used.  Practitioners draft news releases, disseminate media kits, and 
pitch stories to media outlets to inform the general audience of events and services the 
church offers.   
 The religious world often extends to the general population due to the growing 
popularity of mega-churches.  Mega-churches have created a culture that openly connects 
secular practices with organized religion, while effectively utilizing media to gain more 
exposure.  The leaders of these multi-million dollar establishments appear to be more 
approachable than traditional religious leaders. They reach members unorthodoxly by 
recreating conventional practices into acceptable and relevant forms for mass appeal 
(Thumma, 1996).   
Mega-churches incorporate mixes of jazz, hip-hop and gospel into their worship 
service, unlike the piano, organ and drum combo seen at many traditional churches.  The 
building structure is also different from the conventional churches, which often feature a 
steeple and stained glass windows.  Mega-churches are built to resemble office 
complexes, warehouses and even sports arenas (Werner, 2011).  Leaders of mega-
churches are accustomed to receiving attention from their congregations and beyond 
because of their charismatic appeal and seemingly innate ability to express and 
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implement their vision with the support of hundreds of thousands of followers (Thumma, 
1996).   
 Like the mega-church, the Roman Catholic Church serves as a very influential 
institution in the United States.   With more than one billion members worldwide, it is 
among the oldest organized religions (Garcia, 2010).  The Church has long been a 
defender of the poor and oppressed, central to the Christian tradition and doctrine.  It 
serves as the largest non-government provider of medical and educational assistance 
through its schools, hospitals, orphanages, and other social services and has been 
positively and negatively depicted on numerous occasions in news and entertainment 
media (Gibson, 2003).  Primetime sitcoms from Will and Grace to Sex and the City have 
had characters practice Catholicism, and the Pope is steadily on the news media agenda. 
The Church is also very outspoken and influential in politics.  During the 2009 health 
care debates, the Church lobbied Congress to pass an amendment to the healthcare bill, 
barring anyone who receives a new tax credit from enrolling in a plan that covers 
abortion (Wallsten, 2009).  The amendment passed in the House, but failed in the Senate.  
This is just one example of the Church’s political influence.   
Problem Statement 
When prominent religious leaders become involved in scandal, they engage in 
image restoration strategies. This is complicated because their public image and identity 
are based on morality and good judgment, and scandals seem to be a particular betrayal 
of such values.  
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 Ministers, particularly those who serve as senior leaders of their congregation, are 
persuasive and influential.  Parishioners are endeared emotionally to leaders because of 
the roles they play in life’s milestones. Religious leaders officiate weddings, funerals, 
conduct baptisms, and provide marriage counseling and overall spiritual and moral 
advice.  Congregations are also endeared to their pastors because they are seen as chosen 
by God and because they undergo rigorous study and sacrifice to hold leadership 
positions. Catholic priests must study four years in seminary; this is usually following 
four years in college (Gibson, 2003). In addition, priests must take a vow of celibacy and 
remain unmarried.   
  In Protestant institutions, pastors are “called to preach.”  Ingram (1981) defines 
this calling as “divinely initiated, of the individual to engage in the most scared and 
prestigious of religious activities– preaching” (p. 121).  After prospective ministers 
receive and accept their calling, they endure a selection process where a congregation 
hires them.  The congregation’s hiring of a pastor elevates his status to being the person 
“above” them and is then revered as the one chosen by and for them.  The pastor’s status 
becomes more elevated as the church grows larger and a hierarchy of leadership forms.   
 There are often more than ten to twenty assistant ministers and an average of 50 
full time staff members at mega-churches (Thumma, 1996).  More pastors are hired to 
alleviate the senior pastor of some administrative duties, and “to address the plateau in 
growth which had been experienced by the church” (Kiel, 2012, p. 9).  Mega-churches 
are seen not only as religious institutions, but also corporations where the senior pastor 
serves as president and chief executive officer.  These powerful leaders act as the 
church’s spokesperson.  When crises arise within the church, the senior pastor takes 
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responsibility for communication and finding a resolution.  The role of spokesperson is 
seen on a national scale as these leaders are often sought after by media programs to give 
opinion and commentary on various current events.  For example, mega-church pastor, 
Joel Osteen recently appeared on CNN to discuss the death penalty, and Evangelist Billy 
Graham’s support of the Iraq war was quoted in Time magazine (CNN.com, 2012; Gibbs 
& Duffy, 2010).    
Although mega-church pastors are sometimes criticized in media because of their 
excessive lifestyles, they are seen as credible sources by media outlets due to their 
established stance in the church and their position as formal opinion leaders.  While they 
are known for their savvy business sense and marketing practices, these leaders are also 
major activists for the betterment of their individual communities and beyond.  Ohio 
mega-church pastor R.A. Vernon launched the Black Out the Violence campaign after 
losing a 15-year-old parishioner to gang violence (Bernstein, 2012).  In 2004, Bishop 
Eddie Long organized the Re-ignite the Legacy march.  The event was in response to 
Long’s call for black churches to “become vocal on issues like banning same-sex 
marriages, reforming education and health care systems, and creating economic 
opportunities for minorities” (Lee, 2004, p.10).  Their stances on theses issues were 
widely reported, discussed and supported by media outlets, critics and the general 
audience, respectively. 
The Catholic Church leadership early established itself as having a preeminent 
role in social, moral and religious contexts.  Pope John Paul II, Pope Benedict XVI and 
Mother Teresa are known throughout the world for their theological intelligence, and 
iconic status (Weigel, 2005).  Catholic priests’ charge is to fill the role of Jesus Christ, 
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“the priest is the visible presence on earth of Christ teaching, Christ preaching, Christ, 
feeding, Christ, suffering…” (Bevilacqua, 2003 as cited in Gibson, 2003, p. 86).   
Mega church leaders and Catholic Church leaders receive a significant amount of 
attention in the local and national news when they fall short of their religious charge and 
moral training.  This exposure can lead to audience distrust and removal from governing 
boards.  It is imperative that the leaders select the appropriate strategies that will repair 
and restore their images to pre-crisis states. 
                                                        Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is three fold:  first, it examines and compares the image 
restoration strategies and stances used by mega-church leaders and the Boston Diocese of 
the Roman Catholic Church and determine their success; second, it identifies contingent 
factors that led to the choice of strategy and stance; and third, it initiates argument for the 
addition of religious leaders as a separate category of image repair.  Benoit’s Image 
Repair Theory (Benoit 1997a; Benoit, 2000) and the Contingency Theory (Cancel, 
Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997) are applied to determine type of strategy used and 
factors that led to its selection. 
  The Boston Diocese priests do not have the liberty to speak to media; therefore, 
the Diocese’s Cardinal serves as the spokesperson. The Cardinal is responsible for 
speaking on the accused priests’ behalf without foreknowledge of the disgraceful act.    
Mega-church leaders are the spokespersons for their respective institutions and for 
themselves.  They have foreknowledge about the act(s) as well as the motivations that led 
to the act(s).  Based on this information, this study will analyze whether there is a 
significant difference in the way these two respond to crises.   
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 Historically, scholars apply image restoration strategies to three general groups: 
politicians, corporations, and most recently, celebrities.  Because their audience and 
services are different, as well as public expectation about moral behavior, religious 
leaders cannot be placed in neither group and therefore require a category of its own.   
Significance of Study 
 In a practical sense, this study will provide religious crisis managers, 
spokespersons, and leaders with appropriate crisis communication strategies in the wake 
of a scandal, and effectively manage crises.  By analyzing similar cases, a specific 
strategy or set of strategies can be associated with successful image repair efforts and one 
may conclude that institutions involved in similar situations should use these strategies 
(Coombs & Schmidt, 2000). 
 For the study of public relations and the growing area of image repair in 
association with the contingency theory on a theoretical level, it is significant to 
recognize the importance of religious leaders and institutions.  Seen as placing more 
value on morals, beliefs and values (Legg, 2009; Shin, 2008), religious crisis 
communication merits scholarly attention because little research has been done in this 
area despite the high incidence of crises involving religious leaders.  Religious 
institutions are considered cornerstones of the community and its enactment of crisis 
communication plans should be distinguishable among corporations, celebrities and 
politicians.  This study will analyze these standards and make suggestions for future 
studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF CASES 
 This study analyzes five cases of religious leaders involved in scandal:  Jim 
Bakker, Ted Haggard, Eddie Long, Henry Lyons, and Jimmy Swaggart as well as 
examine the Roman Catholic Church’s response to several sexual misconduct allegations 
against priests in Boston, Massachusetts.  All the leaders analyzed, with the exceptions of 
Ted Haggard and Jimmy Swaggart, were involved in legal issues. The Protestant 
denomination leaders were chosen to study because of their nationwide popularity and 
high volume of media attention received before, during and after their respective 
scandals. They are all leaders of mega-churches throughout the United States and have all 
been accused publically of committing acts contrary to moral teachings of the church that 
they represent. These acts were all cases of sexual misconduct or financial deception 
were considered offensive by the mass audience and regarded as a betrayal by members 
of the respective congregations.   The Roman Catholic Church has also received 
enormous media attention in the wake of its sexual abuse scandals, and its response to 
these allegations was analyzed.  
Case of Evangelist Jim Bakker 
 Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker founded the television show, Praise the Lord (PTL), 
in the early 1970s.   PTL grew into a multifaceted ministry that regularly attracted more 
than 10 million viewers, a network of over 9,000 cable systems and 200 broadcast 
stations. They also built a resort and religious theme park (Bakker, 2001). 
 In 1987, Bakker resigned from his position as president and chair of the board of 
PTL after his sexual encounter with church secretary Jessica Hahn was revealed (Tidwell, 
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1993).  During this revelation, it was also discovered that Bakker and three of his top 
PTL aides had committed massive wire and mail fraud (Tidwell, 1993). At the time, 
Baker and PTL executives planned to build a 504-room hotel near his theme park. The 
group offered lifetime partnerships to individuals making a one-time $1,000 payment to 
fund the project; this partnership would allow donors to stay at the hotel for four days and 
three nights each year for the rest of their lives. Bakker eventually sold more partnerships 
than needed and kept the surplus for himself and his associates, and used $250,000 to buy 
Hahn’s silence. 
 Bakker was found guilty on twenty-four counts of fraud and initially sentenced to 
forty-five years in federal prison (Tidwell, 1993).  In 1993, Bakker’s son spearheaded a 
letter writing campaign to the parole board resulting in his sentence being reduced to 
eight years (Bakker, 2001). After his release from prison, Bakker moved into a 
rehabilitation facility for addicts and gang members and wrote and published his 
autobiography.  The book, which detailed his scandal, trial and prison time, sold 100,000 
copies in six months.  Bakker has since remarried and begun a new ministry in Missouri. 
Table 1  
Bakker Timeline of Events 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
March 15, 1987 
 
Assemblies of God officials announced a formal investigation 
was under way into allegations of sexual misconduct of Jim 
Bakker. 
March 21, 1987 Bakker resigns as head of his ministry, PTL, citing blackmail. 
 
March 23, 1987 In a videotaped statement, Bakker retracts his statement of 
blackmail, says he resigned to thwart a hostile takeover of PTL. 
 
 
10 
 
	  
Table 1 (continued). 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
April 25, 1987 
 
Three members of a family filed a $601 million lawsuit in Federal  
District Court against Jim Bakker, charging that their 
contributions were used for “illegal, illicit and immoral” purposes 
April 28, 1987 PTL leadership announced it discontinued Bakker’s salary and 
declared that he would not be allowed to return to the ministry. 
May 6, 1987 Bakker and associate pastor, Richard Dortch dismissed as 
ministers of the Assemblies of God. 
May 28, 1987 The Justice Department opened a preliminary inquiry into reports 
that Bakker and his wife, Tammy Faye, were involved in financial 
wrongdoing at the PTL television ministry. 
December 5, 1988 The Federal Government indicted Jim Bakker, Dortch, and 
Bakker aides David and James Taggart with 24 counts of fraud 
and conspiracy. 
October 6, 1989 Jury finds Bakker guilty on all 24 counts; sentenced to 45 years in 
federal prison and a $500,000 fine. 
December 12, 1994 Bakker released on parole. 
October 10, 1997 Bakker released from federal parole, begins writing 
autobiography and moves into the Los Angeles Dream Center, a 
rehabilitation facility for addicts and gang members. 
January 1, 2003 Bakker begins broadcasting the Jim Bakker Show in Missouri. 
 
 
Case of Pastor Ted Haggard 
 Ted Haggard was a popular Colorado pastor who served as the president of the 
National Association of Evangelicals and spiritual advisor for President George W. 
Bush’s administration. Haggard boasted a congregation of more than 14,000, Colorado’s 
largest at the time, and was a published author, having written twelve books on the 
subjects of marital faithfulness and the dangers of pornography and prostitution (Philipps 
& Correll, 2006).  In 2005, Time magazine named him one of the country’s twenty-five 
most influential evangelicals. 
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 One year after receiving these accolades, male prostitute Mike Jones claimed 
Haggard engaged in a three-year affair with him and used crystal methamphetamine in 
his presence (CNN.com, 2009).  Jones made the affair public after he became disgruntled 
with Haggard publically speaking out against a Colorado initiative banning same sex 
marriages.  Jones told ABC reporter Dan Harris, “I had to expose the hypocrisy. He is in 
the position of influence of millions of followers, and he's preaching against gay 
marriage, but behind everybody's back doing what he's preached against" (Harris, 2006, 
p. 1).  Consequently, Haggard resigned from his posts as head of the National 
Association of Evangelicals and as pastor of New Life church.  He has since begun a new 
ministry and received an enormous amount of media attention. Haggard’s life was 
chronicled in the 2009 HBO documentary, The Trials of Ted Haggard; he and his wife 
appeared on an episode of Divorce Court, and most recently the couple was featured in 
an episode of Celebrity Wife Swap (Little, 2011).   
Table	  2  
Haggard Timeline of Events 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
November 1, 2006 
 
Masseur Mike Jones alleges Haggard paid for sex and used 
crystal methamphetamine over a three -year period. 
 
November 3, 2006 
 
Haggard gives interview with Denver television station denying 
allegations of affair and drug use. 
 
November 4, 2006 Haggard resigns as senior pastor of his church and leader of the 
National Association of Evangelicals. 
April 12, 2007 Haggard and family move to Arizona to begin counseling and 
begin “restoration” process. 
August 25, 207 Haggard releases statement asking for donations.   
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Table 2 (continued). 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
June 15, 2008 
 
Email surfaces where Haggard admits sexual acts and drug use 
with Jones. 
 
November 8, 2008 
 
In several guest sermons, Haggard confesses his actions stem 
from sexual abuse by an adult when he was seven years old. 
 
January 29, 2009 
 
HBO airs the documentary, The Trial of Ted Haggard. 
 
January 1-29, 2009 
 
Haggard and wife appear on several media programs, including 
Good Morning America and The Oprah Winfrey Show to offer 
apology and confession for sexual immorality and drug abuse. 
 
March 19, 2009 Haggard and wife appear on Divorce Court. 
 
June 1, 2010 
 
Haggard holds first meeting of new church in his home. 
 
February 12, 2011 
 
Haggard announces he is bisexual. 
 
January 4, 2012 
 
 
Haggard and wife appear on Wife Swap. 
 
Case of Bishop Eddie Long 
 Eddie Long served as senior pastor of 25,000 member, Georgia-based mega-
church, New Birth Missionary Baptist church, for more than a decade.  His $3 million 
annual salary, $350,000 Bentley, and private jet are three of the many examples of his 
financial and material gains in ministry. 
 Long had far-reaching political, physical and economic influence.  He was 
responsible for promoting anti-gay legislation, producing a fitness infomercial, and 
building a hospital in Kenya.  He also officiated the funeral of Coretta Scott King, hosted 
by his church (www.eddiellong.com, 2011; Poole, 2011a).   
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 In fall of 2010, two young men accused Long of coercing them into sexual 
relationships when they were teenage members of his congregation (Poole, 2011a).  The 
men claimed that Long used trips, expensive gifts and paid positions on Long’s staff to 
maintain discretion.  Later, three additional men came forward with similar allegations. 
All of the men attended the pastor’s Longfellow Academy at the time of the alleged 
events and claim that he selected them to be his Spiritual Sons.  This title allowed the 
young men access to numerous celebrities and participation in a spiritual covenant 
ceremony between Long and each young man (Poole, 2011a). 
 Long has since denied the allegations, but agreed to an out of court mediation and 
undisclosed settlement.  He most recently stepped down from his position as senior 
pastor, announcing to the church that he is “taking time off to focus on family” after his 
wife initially filed for divorce (Poole, 2011b, p. 6).  She has since withdrawn her petition 
for divorce twice and Long has assumed the title of king at his New Birth congregation. 
Table 3 
Long Timeline of Events 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
September 21, 2010 
 
2 men filed lawsuits alleging Long coerced them into having sex 
with him in exchange for lavish trips, cars and cash. 
 
September 22, 2010 
 
3rd lawsuit filed by a former member of New Birth Missionary 
Baptist  
Church, claims Long made accuser call him “Daddy” and coerced  
him into sexual acts. 
 
September 23, 2010 4th accuser claims he was 17 when he began a sexual relationship 
with Long while accompanying the bishop on a trip to Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
September 24, 2010 
 
Long holds conference call with supporters, said he was "under 
attack,” cancels all interviews and does not take questions from 
the media. 
 
September 26, 2010 
 
Long addresses allegations to his congregation and media, 
comparing his situation to that of biblical characters, David and 
Goliath. 
 
May 10, 2011 
 
As a result of mediation, Long settles lawsuit out of court 
according to undisclosed terms.. 
 
December 20, 2011 
 
Long announces he is leaving the ministry, citing he needs time 
with his family. 
 
January 15, 2012 
 
Long participates in symbolic ceremony where self-proclaimed 
“rabbi” Ralph Messer elevates Long to a position of spiritual 
kingship.  
 
February 3, 2012 
 
Jewish leaders announce ceremony “disrespectful”. 
 
February 6, 2012 Long apologizes to Jewish group, saying it “was not his intent to 
participate in any ritual that is offensive to the Jewish 
community.” 
  
 
Case of Reverend Henry Lyons 
	   Henry Lyons, former president of the National Baptist Convention (NBC), saw 
his scandal unfold in July 1997.  It was then that his wife was arrested for arson and the 
burglarizing of a house that he owned with another woman (Associated Press, 1999). The 
fire prompted an investigation of Lyons’ assets and his finances associated with the NBC, 
the nation’s largest black religious organization with a roster of more than eight million 
members. 
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 As leader of the NBC, Lyons was praised for reducing the organization’s debt and 
bringing favorable publicity to his church with a campaign called Raising the Standard 
(Associated Press, 1999).  Lyons’ predecessor, Rev. Theodore Jemison, brought the NBC 
under public scrutiny due to his support of boxer Mike Tyson during his rape allegations, 
and Lyons was seen as shifting the organization in a positive light (Shipp, 1992).   
 Lyons’ tenure as president ultimately proved to tarnish the image of the NBC.  An 
investigation revealed Lyons purchased luxury cars, homes and a $36,000 diamond ring 
using NBC funds.  Investigators found over $1 million dollars intended for the 
convention’s use in a private account listed in the name of Lyons and his mistress, 
Bernice Edwards.  Lyons was arrested and eventually plead guilty to five federal counts 
of tax evasion and fraud.  As part of a plea deal, 49 other charges were dismissed 
(Associated Press, 1999).  Lyons was sentenced to five years in prison and ordered to pay 
$2.5 million in restitution to the NBC.  After serving four years of his sentence, Lyons 
was released on probation and returned to preaching in St. Petersburg, Florida.   
 In 2009, Lyons sought to regain his post as president of the NBC, but was 
defeated in the election.  He currently is the pastor of a Baptist church in Tampa, Florida.   
Table 4 
 Lyons Timeline of Events 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
July 6, 1997 
 
Deborah Lyons, wife of Henry Lyons, burglarizes and sets fire to 
a house her husband owns with another woman. 
 
July 25, 1997 
 
State attorney begins investigation into Lyons’ finances. 
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Table 4 (continued). 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
February 18, 1998 
 
Lyons and mistress, Bernice Edwards are charged with 
racketeering. 
 
March 8, 1998 
 
Lyons and Edwards plead not guilty to charges. 
 
July 23, 1998 
 
Lyons, Edwards and Harris are cited in a 61-count federal 
indictment, on charges ranging from tax evasion to money 
laundering to bank fraud. 
 
 
March 16, 1999 
 
Lyons resigns from his post as NBC president. 
 
April 14, 1999 
 
Lyons found guilty of all charges and given a 51/2 year prison 
sentence. 
 
November 28, 2003 
 
Lyons is released from prison on probation and returns to 
preaching in Florida.  
 
April 10, 2007 
 
Lyons is defeated in an attempt to be elected President of the 
Florida Baptist Convention. 
 
September 12, 2009 Lyons defeated in election to lead NBC. 
  
 
Case of Evangelist Jimmy Swaggart 
 Jimmy Swaggart was accused of soliciting a prostitute for sex in 1988. This act 
was not only seen as deplorable in the church, but also hypocritical because years earlier, 
Swaggart publically criticized Evangelist Jim Bakker as a “cancer that needed to be 
excised from the body of Christ” in the wake of Bakker’s admission of a sexual 
encounter with his secretary (Legg, 2009, p. 242).  Swaggart also condemned fellow 
Assemblies of God minister Marvin Gorman for “committing an immoral act with a 
woman” (Associated Press, 1988, p. 1). 
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 Swaggart tearfully confessed to his family, congregation and television audience 
in his now infamous I Have Sinned sermon (Kaufman, 1988).  Ultimately, Swaggart lost 
his ministerial license from the Assemblies of God presbytery (Kaufman, 1988). Some 
members of his former congregation supported him, and more than a third joined the non-
denominational church he founded after being defrocked (Legg, 2009). 
 Before the accusations, Swaggart was an immensely successful leader of the 
Pentecostal church.  At the height of his popularity, he boasted a congregation giving 
more than $150 million annually. Millions tuned in to his weekly telecast aired on more 
than 3,000 networks (www.jsm.org).  A parishioner willed $10 million from her estate 
(Kaufman, 1988).   
 Swaggart has since rebounded from this scandal and operates a multi-million 
dollar ministry with his son. 
Table 5  
Swaggart Timeline of Events 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
February 19, 1988 
 
Assemblies of God elders announce investigation into accusations 
of Jimmy Swaggart committing adultery. 
 
February 21, 1988 
 
Swaggart announces to his congregation that he “has sinned” and 
will resign his post for an “indeterminate time.” 
 
February 23, 1988 Assemblies of God leaders order Swaggart to immediately begin 
a two-year rehabilitation that will limit his preaching and place 
him in counseling. 
 
March 29, 1988 
 
National Leaders of the Assemblies of God officially order  
Swaggart be barred from the pulpit for one year. 
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Table 5 (continued). 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
March 31, 1988 
 
Swaggart attorney announces Swaggart intends to return to the 
pulpit in May, with or without the approval of the Assemblies of 
God leaders. 
 
April 4, 1988 
 
Assemblies of God official announces if Swaggart fails to accept 
its ruling within a reasonable time, he will be dismissed from the 
church. 
 
April 8, 1988 
 
Swaggart defrocked as a minister of the Assemblies of God for 
rejecting punishment ordered by national leaders of the church. 
 
May 28, 1988 
 
Swaggart returns to the pulpit, asks congregation for donations to 
keep ministry televised; transitions church into an inter-
denominational status 
 
December 22, 2009 
 
Swaggart launches SonLife Broadcasting network, airing 
nationally and internationally to a viewing audience of over 80 
million. 
 
 
Case of U.S. Roman Catholic Church 
 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) reported in 2004 that more 
than 4,000 priests were alleged to have engaged in sexually abusing more than 10,000 
minors during the period of 1950 and 2002.  One of the most concentrated areas of this 
abuse was Boston, Massachusetts.  The public became aware of sexual abuse and cover-
ups in the Boston Archdiocese after the Boston Globe began a thorough investigative 
study of four priests charged with a number of abuse claims (Rezendes, 2002).   
 The case of Rev. John Geoghan spawned the Globe’s investigation into the 
Boston archdiocese.  For thirty years, Geoghan reportedly raped or fondled more than 
one hundred young boys in the Boston area. Despite victims and parents reporting 
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Geoghan to Catholic leaders, he remained a priest, and was allowed continued contact 
with children as he was transferred from parish to parish. The church finally defrocked 
him in 1998, and in 2002, Geoghan was sentenced to ten years in prison for molesting a 
ten-year-old boy.   
 Rev. Joseph Birmingham reportedly abused more than fifty boys during his 
twenty-nine-year career as a priest.  After he confessed to church officials that he 
molested children, Birmingham was allowed to remain in his position, insisting he had 
been “cured.”  Birmingham died in 1989 before any legal action was taken against him. 
 Like Geoghan, Rev. Paul Shanley was shuffled from parish to parish after church 
officials became aware of sexual abuse allegations against him.  One of the Cardinal’s 
top deputies even gave him a letter of recommendation to transfer to a California church.  
Shanley was arrested in San Diego in 2002 and returned to Boston to face ten counts of 
child rape.   
 The only Boston area priest to admit guilt publicly is Rev. Ronald Paquin. Paquin 
befriended and molested several young boys during his two decades in the ministry.  In 
2002, he pleaded guilty to three counts of child rape and was sentenced to twelve to 
fifteen years in prison. 
 While the Globe offered extensive coverage of the individual cases, the 
investigation’s primary focus was the Catholic Church’s cover-up and silence about the 
abuse. Cardinal Bernard Law served as the spokesperson regarding each case in the 
Boston diocese.  As the diocese’s leader, Law, not the individual leaders was responsible 
for responding to media inquiries and offering any statements related to the cases.  After 
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the paper’s report on the church’s handling of Geoghan, Law announced a zero-tolerance 
policy of sexual abuse and agreed to submit names of the accused priests to prosecutors.   
Table 6  
Boston Diocese timeline of Events 
 
Date 
 
 
Event 
 
May 7, 1992 
 
Massachusetts priest James Porter is charged and sentenced to 18 
to 20 years in prison for sexually abusing more than two dozen 
children. 
 
August 22, 1999 
 
A Massachusetts court brings child rape charges against former 
priest John Geoghan. Geoghan had been repeatedly accused of 
sexually molesting boys but was transferred from parish to parish. 
 
January 9, 2002 After the Boston Globe’s investigative reports, Cardinal Bernard 
Law apologizes to victims of Geoghan and promises a tougher 
line on abusive priests in future 
 
January 18, 2002 
 
Geoghan is convicted of indecent assault and battery of a 10-year-
old boy, for which he later receives a 10-year prison sentence. 
 
January 26, 2002 
 
Cardinal Law writes open letter to members of the Archdiocese of 
Boston on the issue of sexual abuse of children by priests 
 
June 13, 2002 
 
US bishops approve "zero tolerance" national policy on abuse, but 
the Vatican demands changes to protect rights of priests. 
 
September 15, 2002 
 
The Boston Archdiocese reaches $10 million settlement with 
victims of John Geoghan. 
 
December 13, 2002 
 
Cardinal Law resigns as archbishop 
 
August 23, 2003 
 
John Geoghan is killed in a Massachusetts prison. 
 
March 30, 2008 Pope Benedict announces that he is "deeply ashamed" of the 
sexual abuse scandals among priests in the U.S. He says the 
church will not allow pedophiles to remain as priests. 
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Table 6 (continued). 
 
 
Date 
 
Event 
 
September 8, 2011 
 
Victims of sexual abuse by Catholic priests band together to file a 
formal complaint with the International Criminal Court alleging 
that the Catholic Church officials committed a crime against 
humanity. 
 
September 10, 2011 The Vatican responds to the charges as being a “ludicrous 
publicity stunt and misuse of the international judicial process.” 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Crisis Communication 
 Crisis communication is a strategic and deliberate course of action taken by 
organizations that want to resolve a crisis with as little damage to its image as possible.  
Fearn-Banks (2001) described crisis communication as “the verbal, visual, and/or written 
interaction between the organization and its public prior to, during and after the negative 
occurrence” (p. 480).  This vital engagement with publics can serve as the catalyst for a 
stronger relationship between the organization and its publics or as the abrupt end to a 
once mutually beneficial relationship.  Fern-Banks (2001) defined a crisis as “a major 
occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting an organization as well as its 
publics, goods, services, products, and/or good name” (p. 480).  Pearson and Mitroff 
(1993) asserted that crises have five dimensions: high visibility requires immediate 
attention, contains an element of surprise, have a need for action, and are outside the 
organization’s complete control. Crises can take the form of a death of an executive, 
defect of a product, an ill-conceived tweet, or something on the scale of a natural disaster.  
Whatever the case, it should be reiterated that crises have the ability to make or break an 
organization. 
 Several scholars have offered practices and theories concerning what an 
organization should do to maintain successful images before, during, and post-crisis 
(Coombs, 1998; Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Stephens, Malone, & Bailey, 2005).  Cameron, 
Wilcox, Reber, & Shin (2008) describe the process as the “conflict management life 
cycle” (p. 42).  The cycle comprises four stages: Proactive Phase, Strategic Phase, 
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Reactive Phase and Recovery Phase.  The proactive phase includes practitioners being 
aware and informed of issues that potentially could put an organization at risk.  Once an 
issue is identified as an emerging crisis, the cycle enters the strategic phase.  During this 
phase, a plan is constructed to combat the specific issue.  The reactive phase witnesses 
implementation of the crisis communication plan and lastly, strategies to restore the 
image and reputation of the organization occur during the recovery phase.   
 A crisis contingency plan should be prepared before a crisis occurs.  This stage of 
crisis communication anticipates public awareness and prepares for undesirable situations 
in effort to minimize mistakes.  The second component is to understand the nature of the 
crisis.  Knowing exactly what allegations are being brought against an organization is 
crucial, as is identifying and understanding the concerns of relevant audiences.  Benoit 
(1997a) asserted that in order for communication to be persuasive, the correct audience(s) 
must be targeted. Audience perception and response is proven to be vital in the success of 
an organization’s image repair process.  It has also been shown that not only companies 
should direct their attention to target audiences, but also public officials. 
 In analyzing the crisis situation, it is important to not only understand the 
communicative choices, but also the importance of crisis responses in general (Coombs, 
1998). The most effective public relations responses include using a single spokesperson 
to speak on behalf of the organization, providing immediate communication to 
constituents and maintaining open communication with external sources (Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001).  Single spokespersons serve to maintain a unified message; the 
use of multiple representatives can result in a variety of contradictory messages. An 
organization that remains silent may lose the trust of its constituents.  Prompt statements 
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are necessary in order to not appear to “stonewall” the audience (Seeger et al., 2001, p. 
160).  Lastly, consistent communication is necessary to defuse speculation on the part of 
media outlets.  Seeger et al., (2001) note the blaring irony of these responses - media 
outlets and constituents want an immediate response, even though the characteristics of 
crises includes its element of surprise and ambiguity.  Nevertheless, successful 
organizations adopt these strategies.   
Contingency Theory 
 The contingency theory focuses on how to manage conflict between an 
organization and its publics and audiences.  The theory recognizes conflict as being a 
natural and positive force in the public-organization relationship; both the organization 
and its publics will have goals and values and the contingency theory makes suggestions 
on how these differences should be bridged (Lumpkins, Bae, & Cameron, 2010; Shin, 
2004; Shin, 2008; Shin, Park, & Cameron, 2006).   
 Founding researchers of the contingency theory sought to expand the scope of and 
shift the existing excellence paradigm. The excellence theory names the two-way 
symmetrical model as the ideal model of public relations, thus positioning it as a 
normative theory (Grunig & Grunig, 1992). Two-way symmetrical communication 
promotes dialogue between organizations and their publics, allowing for compromise and 
resolution in an effective, transparent manner (Grunig, 2001).  Cancel et al., (1997) found 
the excellence model to be unsupported by empirical research, and Stoker and Tusinski 
(2006) found symmetrical communication posed moral problems, which may lead to 
ethically questionable behavior.  Cancel et al., (1997) gave the example of an anti-
abortion group compromising with a pro-choice group.  These groups are fervently 
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convinced that their respective stances speak for the majority of society; therefore, a 
compromise would be seen as rejecting strong-held beliefs.  In essence, to change an 
organization’s behavior would be morally repugnant. 
In effort to demonstrate the many stances that actually take place, researchers 
suggest that the strategic and conflictual relationships between an organization and its 
publics be placed on a continuum anchored by pure advocacy and pure accommodation 
(Cancel et al., 1997).  Advocacy describes how each group serves its own interests and 
accommodation explains how each party considers the other party’s interest.  This 
description of advocacy illustrates the traditional purpose of the public relations practice, 
“the function of a public relations practitioner is to advocate, much like an attorney 
representing one side of an issue,” (Smith, 1972 as cited in Cancel et al., 1997).  Other 
scholars have noted that the practice of public relations entails representing the client in a 
favorable light and work for its best interests (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000). 
 Accommodation serves to represent the two-way symmetrical model of public 
relations where communication has balanced effects and supports “policies and actions 
that are mutually beneficial to both parties (Wilcox & Cameron, 2007, p. 63).  As 
opposed to advocacy, accommodation welcomes the interests of the opposing party.  
Grunig (2001) hailed accommodation as two-way symmetrical communication between 
an organization and its publics, that provides the “normative ideal for public relations” (p. 
13).  Contingency theory argues against a normative model, suggesting a degree of 
flexibility depending on the requirements of an issue as it evolves. Between advocacy and 
accommodation are “a wide range of discrete operational stances and public relations 
strategies that entail different degrees” of the two extremes (Cancel et al., 1997, p. 37). 
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 This continuum was the result of in-depth interviews with public relations 
professionals and educators who attest that the decisions made during a conflict/crisis 
depends on many factors (Pang, Jin, & Cameron, 2010).  A variety of contingencies 
contribute to the selection of strategies, including trust, the issue creating the conflict, and 
top management support.  The research team identified eighty-six factors and eleven 
categories – external threats, relationship characteristics, issue under consideration, 
individual characteristics, industry environment, internal threats, political/social/cultural 
environment, organization’s characteristics and public relations department 
characteristics (see Appendix B). These factors limit the degree of accommodation a 
public relations practitioner can adopt when dealing with conflict. Contingency also 
reflects how the two parties interact varies over time and by the situation.  How an 
organization treats a market, audience or public in one situation may be different from 
how it treats another at a different time (Cancel et al., 1997). 
The position an organization takes on the continuum before it interacts with a 
public may also differ from the position it takes during the interaction.  In a follow-up 
study Cancel, Mitrook, and Cameron (1999) tested the advocacy to accommodation 
continuum by interviewing eighteen public relations practitioners. The researchers found 
the factors and stances to be valid representations of a company’s stance, and also added 
factors not identified in the inaugural study (Cancel et al., 1999).  Those factors that 
explain an organization’s stance before the interaction with publics are predisposing 
variables. Predisposing variables “refer to those variables which have their greatest 
influence on an organization by helping to shape the organization’s predisposition 
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towards relations with external publics” (Cancel et al., 1999, p. 180).  The strongly 
supported predisposing values identified in the study are:   
1)  Corporation size – the size of the company can have an influence on how the 
 organization initially approaches a situation; 2)  Corporate culture - usually set by 
 the company’s founder, the corporate culture has an underlying effect on how 
 corporations approach publics;  3)  Business Exposure – what a company 
 produces, its customers and its range of service influences  a corporation’s 
 predisposition toward external publics; 4)  Public Relations Access to Dominant 
 Coalition – the influence the public relations practitioners have on the final 
 decision of how much time, money and resources are used to interact with 
 external publics;  5) Dominant coalition enlightenment – the dominant coalition’s 
 knowledge of the value of maintaining positive relationships with external 
 publics; 6)  Individual characteristics –the dominant coalition member’s ability to 
 be open-minded, education and ability to think strategically (Cancel et. al., 1999, 
 p. 180-183).  
Four other variables identified were situational:   
1)  Urgency of situation - the outcome from an organization's assessment of the 
 urgency of a situation significantly influences how accommodating a corporation 
 will be of the external public in that situation; 2) Threats – the greater the threat 
 the faster the organization will respond to the situation; 3) Potential costs/benefits 
 of strategies – corporations will engage in a stance that offers them the most 
 rewards at minimal costs; and 4) Characteristics of the external public–the 
 public’s size, level of organization, ability to attain media coverage and 
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 reputations are all characteristics related to an external public’s power to  
 negatively impact an organization.  These factors influence how an organization 
 shifts its stance towards an external public as the situation plays out  
(Cancel et al., 1999, p.180).  
A 2005 study analyzed the influence that contingent factors have on an 
organization’s stance of advocacy or accommodation (Shin, Cheng, Jin, & Cameron, 
2005).  The study examined the U.S. Department of Agriculture, American Airlines, 
Massachusetts Military Reservation and the United Parcel Service’s stance during their 
high profile conflicts. The results concluded that strategies as well as stances of an 
organization and its publics change over time. 
 More research following the initial study tested the validity of the variables (Shin, 
Cameron, & Cropp, 2006; Shin, Park et al., 2006).  Shin, Cameron et al., (2006) surveyed 
public relations practitioners in the United States to determine how each of the 86 
variables influenced their practice to first quantify them.  The most influential of the 
external variables were:  the industry environment, public relationships, 
political/social/cultural environment, external threats, and public power.  The researchers 
found the organization’s development, organization’s structure, public relations 
department independence, public relations department governance, management 
characteristics, individual capabilities, and individual characteristics were the most 
influential of the internal variables.  The results of the survey indicated that the 
contingent variables were valid, and based on the philosophical concept of Occam’s 
Razor, that the contingency theory was found to be precise and evidence-based in its 
foundation.   
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  The results of the U.S. study mirrored that of a study conducted on public 
relations practitioners in South Korea (Shin, Cameron, et al., 2006).  The practitioners 
noted that all 86 variables were influential to practice in South Korea, but found that 
public relations practitioners’ predispositions towards altruism, the ability to handle 
complex problems, communication, competency, information use, and personal ethics 
and potentially damaging publicity were the most influential variables among the 86. 
 These variables focus on “essentially conflictual aspects of organization-public 
relationships and lead to the strategic management of relationships under the complex 
and changing environments (Shin, 2004, p. 191).  In the “conflict management life 
cycle,” (Cameron et al., 2008, p. 68) the contingent variables are analyzed in the strategic 
phase.  These variables would then influence the stances and image restoration strategies 
an organization implements during the reactive phase.   
Image Restoration Strategies 
 The image repair theory explains communication as goal-driven and necessary to 
restore tarnished images of public leaders.  Benoit (1997a) offered several strategies to 
aid in self-defense discourse, but stipulates that the theory can only be applied if the 
following two criteria have been met: 1) an offensive act has occurred, and (2) an 
individual or organization has been accused of being responsible for that act. 
The five broad strategies offered in the plan are: denial, evasion of responsibility, 
reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification (See Appendix A). 
 Benoit explains two types of denial:  simple denial and shifting the blame. Simple 
denial is when the accused asserts the offensive act did not occur, or that the act created 
no harm (Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004). For example, Rick Santorum’s denial of using the 
 
30 
 
word ‘black,’ included the assertion that he actually said blah people (Crugnale, 2012).  
Shifting the blame suggests someone else performed the disgraceful act. President Barack 
Obama claimed problems with the economy were inherited, thereby shifting the blame to 
the previous administration (Jackson, 2011).   
 Evasion of responsibility is employed by “those who are unable to deny performing 
the act in question” (Benoit, 1997a, p. 76).  Four tactics fall under the umbrella of evasion 
of responsibility:  provocation, defeasibility, accident and good intentions.  Provocation 
is when an act is done in response to another act, meaning the act was unavoidable.  
Company layoffs can be attributed to provocation.  If the business proved 
underperforming, then layoffs are necessary to remain viable.  Defeasibility entails 
evading responsibility by alleging that the accused had no control over the attack. For 
example, an airline will not take responsibility for the actions or consequences of the 
actions of unstable passengers. Accident clearly means that the act was not premeditated 
or contrived.  Len-Rios and Benoit (2004) state that if an event is named as an accident, it 
“must seldom occur and the rhetor must show that there was no intent to commit the act” 
(p. 97).  The last technique used to evade responsibility is good intentions.  The accused 
can cite there were good intentions when engaging in the offensive behavior, but for 
whatever reason, the actions went awry. An example of good intentions was Target’s 
unveiling of a new fashion line on its website.  The site was so popular that the server 
could not accommodate the overwhelming number of people visiting the site and resulted 
in the site crashing. 
  The next heading of strategies is reducing the offensiveness of the event.  By using 
these strategies, the accused lessens the severity of the action.  Bolstering identifies and 
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highlights the accused’s good qualities in effort to take attention away from the wrongful 
act. For example, after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the company stated they have “always 
taken steps to maintain safe operations as risks changed and energy technologies 
evolved” (Tillerson, 2010, p. 3).  Minimization lessens the seriousness of the action.  The 
accused downplays the consequences of the action and asserts that the behavior has been 
blown out of proportion.  An example of minimization is if an oil company claims that 
because few animals died in a spill, the environmental damage was minimal.  
Differentiation is applied to distinguish the act from other, more offensive acts. For 
example, if someone was to defend himself by saying, stealing $10 is not the same as 
stealing $100.  Those accused of wrong doings can reduce offensiveness through 
transcendence, which places the act in a more favorable context. Len-Rios and Benoit 
(2004) provided the example of throwing paint on someone wearing a fur coat.  The 
action is justified because of the broader context of saving the lives of animals. A 
desperate strategy for the accused is to attack the accusers.  In applying this strategy, the 
accused reveals the faults of the accuser and blames the victim or the press for the 
offensive act. Former Republican presidential hopeful Herman Cain attacked both the 
media and the victim after he referred to Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi as a “princess” 
(Weiner, 2011, p. 3).   He stated, “I only apologized so you all [media] would stop asking 
me about it… ask her why she called the Tea Party people Astroturf a couple of years 
ago” (Weiner, 2011, p. 3).  The last method of reducing offensiveness is compensation.  
Compensation offers the accusers some form of reparation in an effort to regain his or her 
and the public’s trust. For example, a movie theatre offering free passes to the audience 
after a screen malfunction. 
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 Corrective action and mortification are strategies that admit the accused has some 
responsibility in the wrongful action.  To correct the action, the accused acknowledges 
that a negative act has taken place and that he or she will do what they can to correct the 
problem, and attempt to ensure the offensive act will not happen again.  Tiger Woods’ 
corrective action for addressing adulterous affairs was to enter a rehabilitation facility for 
sexual addiction.  When the accused directly apologizes for the disgraceful act, he or she 
is exhibiting mortification.  Mortification takes place when the accused accepts 
responsibility for the offensive act, apologizes, and asks for forgiveness.   
 Image repair draws on an ancient rhetorical strategy called apologia, a Greek term 
meaning “speech of defense” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, p. 533). Benoit’s theory 
of image repair is an alternative to the more traditional approach of apologia. Individuals 
seeking to clear his or her damaged name traditionally have used apologia, and public 
relations scholars have recently applied this concept to the study of organizations 
(Blaney, Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Caldiero, Taylor & Ungureanu, 2009; Coombs & 
Schmidt, 2000). Courtright & Hearit (2002) argued that apologia is used by one defender 
to many audiences, many defenders to many audiences, and many defenders to few 
audiences.  Contemporary analysis of apologia is based on the assumption that mass 
media play a significant role in the creation of the event and the communication of 
subsequent image repair discourse (Caldiero et al., 2009).  Benoit’s (1997a) theory 
merges rhetorical and crisis communication strategies in the immediate aftermath of a 
crisis.   
 Benoit (1997a) revisited his theory and contributed to the body of crisis 
communication research by applying image restoration discourse to corporations in crisis.  
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While the theory offers strategies to cope during crises, it maintains that corporations 
should be proactive against emerging issues.   
 Benoit (1997b) distinguished the situational differences among corporations, 
politicians and entertainers in applying image restorations strategies. These three entities 
each have been held responsible for an offensive action. In comparing and contrasting 
entertainment and politics, Benoit noted that because of the partisan nature of politics, 
there is more probability that his or her opposing party will attack the accused publically.   
Entertainers; however, do not in general have longstanding opponents. Their alleged 
wrongdoings are made public solely by media reports without worry that another actor 
will publically criticize them or initiate attacks. The distinction in job responsibilities is 
also a major difference between entertainers and politicians. The decisions that politicians 
make can negatively or positively affect the lives of their constituents, whereas 
entertainers’ jobs do not “have a serious impact on lives” (Benoit, 1997b, p. 255). 
 Corporations differ in their nature. Despite the recent Supreme Court decision, a 
corporation is not a person, but a collection of individuals bound together around a 
common goal. If an employee deviates from this goal and creates a crisis or scandal, the 
corporation can argue that it was an individual action not encouraged or condoned by the 
corporation.  Neither entertainers nor politicians have this liberty. A politician can be 
called to account for the utterances of his or her supporters. They are their own brand and 
must solely deal with the consequences of their own actions as well as those who act in 
their name.  Corporations, like politicians must respond to public criticism by 
competitors, mainly in advertising, whereas entertainers rarely scrutinize one another. 
Again, like politicians, the actions of a corporation can affect a great number of people. 
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Finally, the major difference between a corporation, entertainers and politicians is that 
corporations are more likely to face litigation.  The actions of their company can affect 
lives, and they are often required to take corrective action or make compensation on a 
colossal scale that neither entertainers nor politicians are subject. 
 The differences in the nature of these entities suggest that there are also 
differences in their use of image repair strategies.  The following sections will discuss 
image repair strategies used in the areas of politics, entertainment and corporations to see 
if there are any insights offered to the religious contexts and also examine image repair 
strategies used by religious leaders.   
Image Repair and Politicians 
 There have been several scholarly articles published on politics and image repair 
(Benoit & Henson, 2009; Garcia, 2011; Kaylor, 2011; Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004; Liu, 
2007; Liu, 2008).  These articles concentrate on the use and effectiveness of image repair 
strategies. Overwhelmingly, these studies found that politicians all bolstered their image 
during a crisis while incorporating unsuccessful strategies. 
 Len-Rios and Benoit (2004) applied the image restoration strategy to the case of 
U.S. Congressman Gary Condit. In 2001, Condit was accused of being romantically 
involved with a missing federal intern. Interviews and speeches given by the 
congressman during the time of Levy’s disappearance were analyzed, and denial, 
differentiation, and attacking his accuser (Levy’s mother) were identified as the main 
strategies used by Condit. Because his position required maintenance of favorable 
opinion among his constituents and because of the seriousness of the situation, the 
authors concluded that these were ineffective image restoration strategies.  The authors 
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suggest mortification and corrective action would have been the best course of action to 
take in this case. Because Condit did not admit to any wrongdoing, his strategies cost him 
his position in congress and created tension between him and his political party.   
 Former president George W. Bush faced a hailstorm of controversy due to his 
handling of Hurricane Katrina.  In his attempt to repair his image against counter 
arguments made by a variety of sources, Bush used bolstering, defeasibility, and 
corrective action (Benoit & Henson, 2009). The scholars found that due to his position as 
president and commander in chief, the strategies were ineffective.  Because he did not 
apologize for his part in the delayed effort, Bush was seen as both incompetent and 
insensitive. Other research has shown that this combination of responses is used often by 
public figures even though mortification is noted to be more effective in restoring public 
image (Blaney & Benoit, 2001; Benoit, 1997a).  Liu (2007) examined Bush’s major post-
Katrina speeches to determine their effectiveness in his image restoration.  The analysis 
of nine speeches found that Bush used all five broad image repair strategies:  denial, 
evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action and mortification.  
Liu’s evaluation of editorials revealed a majority of negative feedback, thus resulting in 
an unsuccessful image restoration campaign.   
 Although he executed many strategies, former president Bill Clinton ultimately 
used mortification in his discourse during the Monica Lewinsky scandal (Garcia, 2011).  
By doing so, he maintained his approval rating, indicating a successful strategy.  Image 
restoration research proves that mortification “can be vital to image restoration effects,” 
especially in political cases (Garcia, 2011, p. 104). Politicians face heighted public 
scrutiny because they are elected to posts.  If the electing population does not feel as 
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though their representative is taking responsibility for his or her culpable actions, then it 
may translate to not taking responsibility for their actions on the job. 
Image Repair and Corporations 
 Corporations are faced with extreme public scrutiny, primarily because the mass 
audience has purchased their defective product or service.  In 2000, reports surfaced that 
Bridgestone-Firestone tires were alleged to be responsible for as many as 271 deaths 
(Associated Press, 2005).  Blaney et al., (2002) analyzed the company’s response to the 
accusations and found it to be poorly received.  Bridgestone denied the allegations by 
shifting the blame and later attempted corrective action and used paid spokespersons to 
bolster their image.  The researchers concluded that while some strategies can be used 
together (mortification and corrective action), Bridgestone combined two that proved 
detrimental to the company.  The public interpreted shifting the blame and corrective 
action as greed-based ploys serving only the interest of the company (Blaney et al., 
2002).  The mortification-corrective action combination has been proven by scholars as 
the best strategies for corporations (Benoit, 1997b; Coombs, 1998).  Duke University 
applied these strategies during its lacrosse team scandal.  In 2006, an exotic dancer 
accused three members of the lacrosse team of rape.  Fortunato’s (2008) analysis of 
Duke’s strategies indicated that they were successful.  The college’s public relations 
department managed to frame the story by emphasizing its corrective action efforts, while 
accepting responsibility for the incident. 
 Brinson and Benoit (1999) introduced another combination of image repair 
strategies often used by corporations.  Separation consists of bolstering, shifting the 
blame and corrective action.  Instead of accepting full responsibility for any wrongdoing, 
 
37 
 
the company separates itself from a specific group within the organization.  Texaco 
separated itself from three executives who were taped using racist language that proved 
to severely damage the company’s reputation (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000).  The 
researchers argue that using separation, instead of mortification reduces a company’s 
chance of receiving a lawsuit.  Plaintiffs can easily win monetary settlements if the 
corporations “acknowledge responsibility for the crisis” (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000, p. 
176).   
 Oprah Winfrey’s personal image repair efforts were incorporated in the 
corporation category because “her image is interwoven with her company’s public 
image” (Oles, 2010, p. 37).  Oles (2010) conducted a longitudinal analysis of three 
separate incidents that forced Winfrey to defend her reputation - her 1996 libel lawsuit 
with the Texas Beef Group, her mishap at a Paris boutique, and her selection of the 
fabricated memoir, A Million Little Pieces into her book club.  The author found Winfrey 
used denial as her first strategy in all three incidents.  By transferring the blame onto 
someone else, she maintained her favorable public image and denied any malicious intent 
on her actions.  Oles (2010) also found that Winfrey used her show as a setting to defend 
her image because it “provides a safe and controllable forum” (p. 56).  The research 
inferred that it was necessary to conduct strategic image repair actions in each situation 
because Winfrey is directly linked to her company.  Because of the strategies she 
implemented, the research concluded that Winfrey’s post-crises image was viewed more 
positively than her pre-crises image.   
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Image Repair and Entertainers 
 While mortification may not be the best option for corporations, researchers have 
asserted that it is the best strategy for individuals (Benoit & McHale, 1999; Brazeal, 
2008). Mortification gives the accused an appearance of integrity, and carries with it an 
expectation that the audience shall feel sympathy and ultimately will respect the accused 
for admitting to the fault.  Mortification also helps to swiftly move the crisis from the 
media agenda.  The longer a story receives media attention, the more likely it will play 
out like a soap opera, leaving the audience seeking more answers (Seeger et al., 2001). 
An example of the successful use of mortification is the case of entertainer Hugh 
Grant (Benoit 1997b).  Grant was a rising Hollywood actor accused of lewd behavior 
with a prostitute. This accusation also threatened the image of his long-time girlfriend, 
also a Hollywood actor.  Grant’s initial and primary use of mortification was evaluated as 
favorable. Benoit noted that because Grant did not face public attack by an opponent, as 
do politicians, the newsworthiness of his story faded, and his image was restored.  
It is important to note that to be effective, mortification must appear genuine. The 
individual must request forgiveness and admit guilt (Benoit, 2000).  Brazeal’s (2008) 
analysis of NFL player Terrell Owens showcases a poorly executed use of mortification. 
Owens crisis began after he was deactivated from the Philadelphia Eagles after a contract 
dispute.  The Eagles refused to renegotiate Owens’ contract mid-season, and in retort, 
Owens became belligerent and openly critical of the team and its coaching staff (Brazeal, 
2008).  After his release from the team, Owens attempted to repair his image by holding a 
press conference where he bolstered his image and made feeble attempts at mortification.   
“Owens made the critical mistake of never saying, ‘I was wrong’.  Instead, he minimized 
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his role and offered vague apologies that seemed like efforts to smooth over (rather than 
address) the damage he had done” (Brazeal, 2008, p. 149).  Brazeal (2008) concluded that 
the half-hearted apology did not improve his image with Eagles and subsequently Owens 
was not reinstated.   
 When photos surfaced of Olympic gold medalist Michael Phelps allegedly 
smoking from marijuana pipe, he immediately released a mortification–filled statement.  
Walsh and McAllister-Spooner (2011) analyzed Phelps’ image repair strategies and 
found that mortification was his dominate strategy.  His use of this strategy was 
significant because five years earlier, Phelps was charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol just months after winning eight Olympic medals.  The authors also 
determined the successfulness of Phelps image repair based on media reaction.  Through 
a qualitative content analysis of print and online coverage of the controversy, the authors 
concluded that media outlets were forgiving.  Many columnists dismissed the severity of 
Phelps’ situation because of his age and public belief that his use of marijuana was non-
offensive.  It appeared that Phelps’ image repair strategies were successful. 
Image Repair and Religious Leaders 
 There has been limited literature on the efforts of image repair made by individual 
religious leaders. Studies have either focused concern on the Roman Catholic Church’s 
response to sexual abuse allegations, or religious public relations practitioners’ selection 
of strategies, but not on the efforts of individuals to restore their image (Garcia, 2010; 
Kane, 2008; Shin, 2008).  Religious leaders are also public figures.  Congregations or 
religious institutions (constituents) elect them to their positions and these congregations 
must support them in order to maintain their positions in the church. Blaney and Benoit 
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(1997) noted how Jesus employed religious restoration strategies to defend himself and 
his religious beliefs. They analyzed the responses by Jesus to several accusations towards 
him, and suggested that he primarily applied denial and transcendence in his defense. The 
author’s concluded that although Jesus was crucified, his restoration discourse proved 
successful due to the countless number of people who accept him as the Son of God.  
Blaney and Benoit’s analysis serves as the first to apply image restoration discourse to a 
religious leader, but it is limited to a leader defending his religious beliefs.  To this point; 
however, no examination of the strategies applied to leaders defending themselves after 
being accused of a disgraceful act has been published.  
 Protestant religious leaders are similar to politicians and entertainers in the sense 
that they are persuasive public figures. Although many represent an institution, they are 
held responsible for their actions individually. However, this is not the case of the 
Catholic Church.  Often, the general public does not know the name of individual priests 
involved in controversy.   The Catholic Church has taken much scrutiny over its 
systematic silence with sexual abuse cases involving priests. High ranking members of 
the Church hierarchy have been found to be as guilty as the individuals accused of the 
acts because when misconduct was reported, the Church did not “accept organizational 
responsibility for its personnel” nor did it hold the priests responsible (Dunne, 2004, p. 
490).    
When an individual religious leader is accused of an offensive action, he or she 
faces exceptionally negative criticism from the media and public because he or she was 
previously viewed as a moral and spiritual advisor example to others.  The mega-church 
culture; however, has merged the senior pastor and church into one.  Since the pastor is 
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oftentimes the church’s founder, visionary, and chief executive officer, his or her name is 
synonymous with the church.  Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, no institutional voice 
speaks on the mega-church leader’s behalf; therefore, he or she is responsible for their 
image repair. 
Studies using both image repair strategies and the contingency theory as 
theoretical frameworks for research in crisis communication are limited.  Holtzhausen 
and Roberts (2009) paired the two for their examination on the effectiveness of image 
repair strategies and contingency theory in crisis management.  Their analysis of the 2003 
Air Force sexual assault scandal concluded that if the cause of the crisis is external to the 
entity, and requires less accommodation, the entity will more likely use advocacy-type 
image repair strategies, such as attacking the accuser and denial.  If an entity has strong 
internal control over the crisis, then the entity will use accommodative strategies such as 
bolstering, corrective action and apology (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009).   
News Media Framing 
News frames are powerful tools that can identify problems, offer solutions, and 
influence public perception (An & Gower, 2009). Entman (1993) suggests frames “select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” 
(p. 52).  Semetko and Valkenberg (2000) identified five prominent news frames used in 
media: 
1.  Human interest frame brings a human face or an emotional angle to the issue.   
2.  Conflict frames reflects conflicts and/or disagreements among individuals, 
 groups and organizations 
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3.  Morality frames put the event, problem, or issue in the morals, social 
 prescriptions and religious tenants 
4. Economic frames reports an event, problem, or issue in terms of the 
 consequences it will have economically on an individual, groups, organizations, 
 or countries. 
5.  Attribution of responsibility frames is a way of attributing responsibility for a 
 cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group. 
 (An & Gower, 2009, p. 108) 
An and Gower (2009) analyzed frames found in news coverage of ten companies 
that faced crisis in 2006:  Enron, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, Wal-Mart, Northwest 
Airlines, Merk, Computer Associate, Goodyear Tire, Boeing, and Delta Airlines.    The 
authors analyzed news stories covered by national newspapers: New York Times, 
Washington Post and USA Today. The analysis revealed that attribution of responsibility 
was the most frequently used frame, followed by economic frame and conflict frame.  
Other studies analyzed frames as being positive, negative or balanced (Haskell, 
2007; Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009).  Haskell (2007) examined the news coverage of 
Canadian Evangelical Christians. The group charged media with unfairly portraying them 
in the news.  Haskell determined that while Canadian Evangelical Christians did receive a 
substantial amount of negative coverage, they also received an equal amount of positive 
coverage, resulting in an overall rating of balanced coverage.  Haskell notes information 
selection as a part of the framing process.  When a story is covered in media, it is 
considered salient because it is placed for audience consumption.   
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Holtzhausen & Roberts (2009) determined the success of image repair strategies 
by analyzing news story importance and story balance. To determine salience, the 
placement of the story was identified, “it is better for a story to be placed on the front 
page of an interior section than to be placed inside the front section” (Holtzhausen & 
Roberts, 2009, p. 175).  To determine news story balance, the tone of the story was 
identified as either positive, negative or balanced.  The findings indicated that the 
majority of the stories were placed on the inside of section A of the newspaper and that 
the overwhelming majority of stories were balanced, yielding a mildly successful image 
repair campaign. 
Religious Public Relations 
 To date, a modest amount of research has been conducted on the ways religious 
institutions practice public relations.  From the vantage of crisis communication, there is 
even less.  Current religious crisis communication research focused on how organizations 
as a whole respond to publics, and not about individual response (Courtright & Hearit, 
2002; Shin, 2008).  Courtright and Hearit’s (2002) study examined the discourse of the 
Christian and Missionary Alliance (C & M A) after a number of students at their 
academy were sexually, mentally, and physically abused.  Their analysis found that 
although individual members committed the deplorable acts, C & M A demonstrated 
several instances of mortification, addressed several corrective actions and offered 
compensation to the victims.  The researchers concluded that the institutional discourse 
applied minimized widespread media attention, reassured key publics that the immoral 
actions will not take place again and exhibited sacrifice in the form of capital costs. The 
study also notes the importance of the discourse settings.  One apology was given during 
 
44 
 
a religious retreat, similar to a church service.  This mirrored the symbolic image of the 
guilty going before the congregation to confess their sins.   
 Shin (2008) applied the contingency theory to religious public relations.  Using a 
survey, religious public relations practitioners were asked to indicate the crisis 
communication/conflict management strategies there were willing to use during a 
conflict.  Crisis communication strategies included denial, shifting the blame, 
provocation, defeasibility, accident, good intentions, bolstering, minimization, 
differentiation, transcendence, attacking the accuser, compensation, and corrective action.  
Conflict management strategies included in the study were: contending, compromising, 
collaborating, accommodating and avoiding.  The study found religious public relations 
practitioners were more likely to use collaborating, contending and compromising in a 
conflict, and corrective action, good intentions and bolstering during a crisis.  The study 
also indicated internal threats, relationship and individual characteristics have a 
correlation with accommodation.  The results indicate religious practitioners primarily 
rely on their morals and religious values to resolve a crisis and these values translate to 
concession and corrective action. 
 To date, only one study has examined the tactics used by religious leaders.  Legg 
(2009) examined the crisis campaign implemented by Jimmy Swaggart during his widely 
publicized sex scandal in 1988.  Using both Benoit’s (1997b) image repair theory and 
Fink’s stage theory, the author sought “how crises both influence and are influenced by 
the organization they affect” and explored “some of the variables the factor of religion 
introduces to image repair discourse” (p. 241).  She concluded that mortification was 
successful for Swaggart.  This finding implied that his primary audience of religious 
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individuals was more concerned with his repentance than his guilt.  The research also 
found that Swaggart structured his message based on his audiences.  For his 
congregation, Swaggart used a combination of mortification, provocation and bolstering 
as the primary strategies.  In media outlets, where a vast audience was present, he relied 
on mortification as his primary strategy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Scholars have offered several actions individuals can take when faced with a 
crisis.  Seeger et al., (2001) posit three general responses to crises.  The authors suggest 
using a single spokesperson, providing immediate communication to constituents, and 
maintaining open communication with external publics. Benoit’s (1997a) image repair 
strategies emphasize the message content.  The five broad strategies of denial, evasion of 
responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification can be 
attributed to each of the cases to be analyzed.  Based on this information and information 
given in the literature review, the following questions are posed:   
 RQ1a: What crisis communication response strategies do mega-church leaders 
employ? 
 RQ1b:  What crisis communication response strategies does the Boston Diocese 
employ? 
 RQ1c:  Is there a difference in the crisis communication response strategies of 
mega-church leaders and the Boston Diocese? 
 RQ1d: Is there a difference in the image restoration strategies overtime? 
 The following set of questions will examine the stances religious leaders take when 
dealing with opposing publics, in these cases, their accusers.  
 RQ2a: What are the stances mega –church leaders take to respond to a crisis?  
 RQ2b:  What are the stances the Boston Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church 
take to respond to a crisis? 
 RQ2c: Do the stances of the religious leaders stances change over time? 
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 Several factors can determine which image repair strategies an accused entity will 
use (Cancel et al., 1997). These factors determine whether an entity’s strategies and 
stances will closely play an advocacy role or whether the entity will accommodate their 
audiences.  Also, because the current study examines factors faced by individuals (with 
the exception of the U.S. Roman Catholic Church), it may be assumed that internal 
control is present; therefore, the following questions are posed: 
 RQ3a: Which contingent factors influenced the stances of mega-church leaders? 
 RQ3b:  Which contingent factors influenced the stances of the Boston? 
 RQ3c:  Is there a difference in the contingent factors of the Boston Diocese and 
mega-church leaders? 
 The audience’s (general and primary) response to image repair strategies is the 
greatest factor in whether the repair campaign was received favorably. Using content 
analysis, researchers were able to determine the success or failure of an image repair 
campaign by analyzing its news frames based on newspaper placement and balance.  
(Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009).  Article placement gives salience to the issue, while the 
frequency of negative frames elevates salience (Haskell, 2007). The following sets of 
questions will determine saliency of religious leader crises:  
 RQ4a: Where was the placement of newspaper articles about mega-church 
leaders? 
 RQ4b: Where was the placement of newspaper articles about the Boston Diocese? 
 RQ4c:  Is there a difference between the placement of mega-church leaders and 
the Boston Diocese articles? 
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 RQ5a:  How were mega-church leaders portrayed in newspaper items? 
 RQ5b:  How was the Boston Diocese portrayed in newspaper items? 
 RQ5c:  Is there a difference in the way the mega-church leaders and the Boston 
Diocese were portrayed in newspaper items? 
 RQ6a:  What is the overall tone of newspaper items about mega-church leaders 
and the Boston Diocese? 
 RQ6b:  What is the overall tone of newspaper items about the Boston Diocese? 
 RQ6c:  Is there a difference between the tone of newspaper items about mega-
church leaders and the Boston Diocese?  
 Five news frames have been identified as commonly used in United States media 
coverage (An & Gower, 2009).  The following research questions identify how news 
articles on religious leaders’ scandals were framed:  
 RQ 7a:  How were newspaper items about the mega-church leaders framed? 
 RQ7b:  How were newspaper items about the Boston diocese framed? 
 RQ7c:  Is there a difference between the news frames of mega-church leaders and 
the Boston Diocese? 
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CHAPTER V 
METHOD 
Unit of Analysis 
 To answer the research questions, this study employed a quantitative content 
analysis of media interviews (television and newspaper), sermons, news releases, 
websites and press conference statements made by Jim Bakker, Tim Haggard, Eddie 
Long, Henry Lyons, Jimmy Swaggart or their representatives and the Boston Diocese at 
the height of their respective scandals.  To answer the success or failure of the campaign, 
columns, editorial, news articles, and readers’ comments from newspapers were 
analyzed.  Media coverage of the controversies can gauge audience reception, “while the 
media does not speak for all people, its reaction to [controversy] had the ability to 
influence how people feel” (Walsh & McAllister-Spooner, 2011, p. 159).  These items 
determined primary and general public responses to the cases. 
 Content analysis serves as a “multipurpose research method developed 
specifically for investigating any problem in which the content of communication serves 
as the basis of inference” (Holsti, 1969, p. 2).  Content analysis can be used to illustrate 
the attributes of messages, and those attributes can be compared overt time to identify 
trends (Poindexter & McCombs, 2000).  Detecting trends in image repair is necessary to 
strengthen the body of empirical research in this area. Coombs & Schmidt (2000) attested 
that to develop more exact prescriptive knowledge, researchers should execute a series of 
similar case studies, “using a series of similar case studies would allow the researcher to 
find patterns that would indicate the effect of specific strategies in a particular type of 
crisis” (p. 164).  By using five individual religious leaders and the Boston Diocese, the 
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current study’s results identified trends used by this entity and determine what strategies 
should be used or avoided. 
Sampling 
 Media outlets sample included national television networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS 
and local stations nearest the areas where the scandal occurred:  Atlanta’s WSBT, WXIA, 
and WGCL; Baton Rouge’s WBRZ, WAFB, and WVLA; Charlotte’s WBTV, WSOC, 
and WCNC; Colorado Springs’ KOAA, KKTV, and KRDO; and St. Petersburg’s WFLA, 
WTSP, and WFTS.  Newspapers included nationals, USA Today, the New York Times, 
and the Washington Post.  These three papers were chosen because of their national 
distribution and “influence” (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009, p. 171).    Papers from areas 
in closest proximity to the scandals were analyzed:  The Atlanta Journal Constitution, the 
St. Petersburg Times, the Charlotte Observer, Colorado Gazette, the Boston Globe and 
the Baton Rogue Advocate.  The Atlanta Journal Constitution, Colorado Gazette, Boston 
Globe articles were selected from the ProQuest newsstand database.  The St. Petersburg 
Times, the Charlotte Observer and Baton Rogue Advocate samples were selected from a 
subscription to their individual online archives. The LexisNexis search engine was used 
to gather national news stories because it is “renowned throughout the academic world as 
reliable, extensive, up-to-date, and technologically-capable of providing multiple sources 
of news and media coverage” (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009, p. 173).  Broadcast media 
outlets were used to determine strategy and stance use only, while print media were used 
for strategy, stance, and effectiveness. 
 The sampling frame of the news releases and news stories coded were those 
published from the day the scandal initially appears in the media until six months later:  
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Jim Bakker, March 3, 1987-September 3, 1987; Ted Haggard, November 2, 2006-May 5, 
2007; Eddie Long, September 21, 2010-March 20, 2011; Henry Lyons, July 6, 1997-
January 6, 1998; Jimmy Swaggart, February 17,1988-August 17, 1988; and Boston 
Diocese, January 6, 2002-July 6, 2002.   This time frame was chosen because it reflects a 
uniform response-time for each case.  Cases involving criminal trials (Jim Bakker, Henry 
Lyons, and the Boston Diocese) took more than six months to resolve; therefore, six 
months served as a parallel timeframe to analyze strategy implementation.   
 In total, 1402 items were analyzed and coded.  Of these, 86 (6.1%) were items 
concerning repair strategies.  Each separate strategy enacted was coded and duplicate 
stories and strategies found in other outlets were eliminated.  For example, if an interview 
was published by a newspaper and later reported on television, it was coded once. 1316 
(93.9%) were newspaper items used to evaluate response strategies.  In terms of image 
repair strategies, religious leaders executed strategies in various outlets:  press 
conferences, sermons, newspaper and television interviews, news releases, websites and 
court proceedings.  Sermons were the most frequently used (n=31, 36.0 %), followed by 
press conference statements (n=13, 15.1%), court proceedings (n=10, 11.6%), local 
newspaper interviews (n=9, 10.5%), national television interview (n=8, 9.3%), local 
television interviews (n=6, 7.0%), news releases (n=4, 4.7%) and website messages (n=2, 
2.3%).   
 Both groups targeted a general audience more than their own respective 
congregations when enacting image repair strategies.  Mega-church leaders addressed the 
general audience 44 (58.7%) times and addressed their congregations 30 times (40.0%).  
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The Boston Diocese addressed the general audience 5 (45.5 %) times and their 
congregation 5 (45.5%) times. 
Table 7 
Religious Leaders’ Targeted Audience 
 
Leader Name 
 
 
General Audience 
 
Congregation 
 
Other 
 
Bakker 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
Haggard 9 1 0 
Long 18 9 1 
Lyons 12 11 0 
Swaggart 2 6 0 
Boston Diocese 5 5 1 
 
 Newspaper items coded for evaluation included news articles (n=954, 72.5%), 
columns (n=173, 13.1%), editorials (n=110, 8.4%) and letters to the editor (n=79, 6.0%).  
In the six month period, 21% (n=276) of the articles were written about Henry Lyons, 
Jimmy Swaggart received 20.1% (n=264), followed by Ted Haggard with 10.8% 
(n=142), James Bakker with 8.7% (n=114) and Eddie Long with 4.3% (n=56).  The 
Boston Diocese of the Catholic Church received 35.3% (n=464) of the total. 
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Table 8 
Newspaper Type by Religious Leader 
  
Coding Categories 
 Each media interview (television and newspaper), sermons, news releases, 
websites and press conference statements were analyzed for content in the following 
categories:  To answer RQ1a-d, the coding categories of speaker, audience, denial, 
evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of event, corrective action and 
mortification are needed to determine Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer’s (2001) general crisis 
response strategies, and Benoit’s (1997a) image restoration strategies. Because leaders 
could employ more than one strategy in each response, only the dominant image repair 
strategy was coded. 
 For RQ2a-c, the coder’s impression of the leader’s perspective was given on a 
Likert- type scale ranging from very advocating to very accommodating.  Like McQuail 
(1992) as cited in Shin et al. (2005)  “coders were trained to base judgments on the likely 
 
Leader Name 
 
 
National Paper 
 
Local Paper 
 
Total 
 
James Bakker 
 
71 
 
43 
 
114 
Ted Haggard 25 117 142 
Eddie Long 8 48 56 
Henry Lyons 21 255 276 
Jimmy Swaggart 101 163 264 
Boston Diocese 127 337 464 
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impression made on an average audience” (p. 403). Also, the date each stance was taken 
determines if the stance and strategies have changed over time.  
  For RQ3a-c, the external contingent variables were coded.  These variables are 
considered threats: litigation, government regulation, potentially damaging publicity, 
scarring of company’s reputation in the general public and legitimizing activists’ claims 
(Cancel et al., 1997).  General political/social environment/external culture variables will 
also be coded:  degree of political support of business and degree of social support of 
business (Cancel et al., 1997). 
 For RQ4a-c, placement was coded as undetermined, front page, front section, or 
local/metro section (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009).  
 RQ5a-c asks about religious leaders’ portrayal.   To determine how newspaper 
items portrayed the leaders individually, coders identified whether a newspaper item 
(column, news article, letter to the editor, online comment, or editorial) was dominantly 
positive, negative or balanced (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009).  To determine the overall 
tone of the item, coders identified column, news article, letters to the editor, online 
comment, or editorial as being positive, negative, or neutral, as posited in RQ6 a-b. 
   RQ7a-c asks how newspaper items were framed. Five framing categories were 
coded:  attribution of responsibility, conflict, economic, human interest, and morality (An 
and Gower, 2009).  Coders identified the dominant framed used in each item.   
Pretest and Intercoder Reliability 
 A pretest was held to clarify the coding process and categories. Two coders, the 
researcher and an additional coder coded five percent of the initial sample (n=100) and 
Holsti’s (1969) formula was used to calculate intercoder reliability. Initial coding 
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indicated several misunderstandings, primarily on the evaluative coding sheet. A second 
training was held to clarify operational definitions, and a second round of coding 
garnered acceptable reliability.  The following reliabilities were calculated for each 
variable: speaker, 1.00;  date, 1.00; audience, .96; image repair strategy, .93; primary 
speaker, 1.00; litigation, 1.00; government regulation, 1.00, damaging publicity, 1.00; 
reputation, 1.00; activists claims, 1.00;  political support, 1.00; political support, 1.00; 
stance, .94; item type, .89; placement, 1.00; newspaper type, 1.00; news frame, .84; story 
balance, .89; tone,.92.     An overall reliability of .96 was calculated between two coders. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
  The first set of research questions examined the three-crisis response 
strategies deemed vital by Seeger et al., (2001) and Benoit’s (1997a) Image Restoration 
Strategies.   Crisis communication response strategies are:  maintaining one consistent 
speaker, offering an immediate response and maintaining open communication, and 
image restoration strategies are:  exhibiting denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing 
offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. 
 RQ1a:  How do mega-church leaders respond to crisis? 
  Mega-church leaders maintained a consistent speaker (leader himself) 56 (74.6%) 
of the seventy-five times that they addressed the crisis. In terms of immediate response, 
mega-church leaders responded to crises six times in the first twenty-four hours after the 
crisis became public.  
 RQ1b:  How does the Boston Diocese respond to crisis? 
 The Boston Diocese maintained a consistent speaker four (57.1%) out of the 
seven times during the six-month period, and did not respond at all in the first twenty-
four hours after the crisis became public.  After initial contact, it was found that each 
entity did maintain communication with external publics.  See Table 9 for full results for 
initial communication time and frequency of continued communication.  
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Table 9 
 
Communication Time and Frequency by Religious leader  
 
  
(24 hours) 
 
(48 hours) 
 
(72 hours) 
 
(1 week) 
 
(2 to 3 
weeks) 
 
(4 to 6 
weeks) 
More 
than 6 
weeks 
 
Bakker 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
Haggard 2 1 0 1 0 1 5 
Long 2 3 1 2 0 3 17 
Lyons 0 0 1 1 0 1 20 
Swaggart 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 
Boston 
Diocese 
0 0 0 1 3 2 2 
 
Mega-church leaders employed reducing offensiveness more than any other image 
restoration strategy (n=26, 34.7%).  The next most used strategy was denial (n=18, 24.0 
%), followed by unknown (n=14, 18%), mortification (n=12, 16.0%), evasion of 
responsibility (n=4, 5.3   %), and corrective action (n=1, 1.3%).  Unknown strategies are 
those instances where the leader acknowledged the crisis situation, but did not employ an 
image repair strategy.  An example of reducing offensiveness is James Bakker’s 
confession that he was “doing his best” as a leader of a multi-million dollar religious 
corporation and simply could not resist temptation (Harris, 1989). See Table 10 for 
individual results.   
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The Boston Diocese employed mortification more than any other strategy (n=9, 54.5   
%).  Following mortification was unknown (n=3, 27.3%), followed by corrective action 
(n=1, 9.1%), and denial (n=1, 9.1%).  The Church did not employ evasion of 
responsibility or reducing offensiveness.  
Table 10 
 Repair Strategies by Religious Leader 
 
Leader 
 
Denial 
 
Evasion of  
Responsibility 
 
 
Reducing 
offensiveness 
 
Corrective 
Action 
 
Mortification 
 
Bakker 
 
3 
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
Haggard 2 0 0 1 8 
Long 5 2 14 0 0 
Lyons 8 2 8 0 0 
Swaggart 0 0 1 0 1 
Boston 
Diocese 
 
1 0 0 1 9 
 
 RQ1c:  Is there a difference in the response strategies of mega-church leaders and 
the Boston Diocese? 
 To determine if there was a difference between leader type (mega-church, 
Catholic church) and communication response strategies, a chi-square test was used. The 
test revealed that the relationship between the consistent speaker strategy was not 
significant, !!(1, N=86)=6.67, p=.10.  Another test measuring speaker communication 
time revealed an insignificant relationship, !!(6, N=86)=11.31, p=.079  
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 A chi-square analysis found that there was a significant relationship between the 
image repair strategies utilized by the mega-church leaders and the Boston Diocese, !!(5, 
N=86)=15.02, p=.010   
 This difference is due to the Boston Diocese’s overwhelming use of mortification 
as a strategy. 
 RQ1d: Is there a difference in the image restoration strategies overtime? 
 During the first month of the crises being made public, the dominant strategies 
enacted by religious leaders were denial (n=7, 26.9%, reducing offensiveness (n=7, 
26.9% ) and  unclear (n=7 26.9%).  The only other strategy used during the first month 
was mortification (n=5,19.2%).  Reducing offensiveness (n=3,42.9%) was the dominant 
strategy used during the second month of the crises, followed by denials (n=2, 28.6%), 
corrective action (n=1, 14.3%) and mortification (n=1, 14.3%).   See Figure 1 for full 
details.  
 
Figure 1.  Image Restoration Strategies over six month period. 
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 RQ2a:  What stances did mega-church leaders take to respond to crisis? 
 RQ2b:  What are the stances the Boston Diocese took to respond to crisis?  
 Mega-church leaders were found to take a “very advocating” stance more than 
any other stance (n=32, 42.7%), while the Boston Diocese was “very accommodating” 
(n=6, 54.5%) to its publics.  The mega-church leaders were neutral or advocating (n=16, 
12 %), while the Boston Diocese was rarely neural or very advocating (n=1, 9.1%). 
Table 11 
Leader by Stance 
 
Leader 
 
Very 
Accommodating 
 
 
Accommodating 
 
Neutral 
 
Advocating 
 
Very 
Advocating 
 
Bakker 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
4 
Haggard 5 2 1 1 1 
Long 0 4 6 1 16 
Lyons 0 0 6 6 11 
Swaggart 2 1 1 3 1 
Boston 
Diocese 
 
6 3 1 0 1 
 
 RQ2c:  Do the stances of the mega-church leaders or the Boston Diocese change 
 over time? 
 Mega-church leaders were found to have changed their stance over time, with the 
stance initially advocating, then becoming more accommodating as time passed. Mega 
church leaders ending stance was coded as predominately accommodating. The Boston 
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Diocese did not have a noticeable change in stance over time as its initial stance was very 
accommodating and ending stance remained very accommodating. 
 RQ3a:  Which contingent factors influenced the stances of mega-church leaders? 
 RQ3b:  Which contingent factors influenced the stances of the Boston Diocese? 
 Damaging publicity (n=86, 100%), reputation (n=86, 100%), legitimizing claims 
(n=86, 100%), political support (n=86, 100%), and social support (n=86, 100%) were 
external variables that influenced both mega-church leaders and the Boston Diocese. 
Litigation (n=76, 88.4%) and Government regulation (n=58, 67.4%) were also influential 
in both groups’ stances. In terms of individual leaders, litigation influenced James Bakker 
(n=6, 100%), Eddie Long (n=27, 100%), Henry Lyons (n=23, 100%) and Jimmy 
Swaggart (n=8, 100%).  The Boston Diocese was also influenced by litigation (n=11, 
100%). James Bakker (n=6, 100%), Ted Haggard (n=10, 100%), Henry Lyons (n=23, 
100%), Jimmy Swaggart (n=8, 100%) and the Boston Diocese were influenced by 
Government regulation.   
 RQ3c:  Is there a difference in the contingent factors of the Boston Diocese and 
 mega-church leaders? 
 A significant association was not found between contingent factors and religious 
leaders. 
 RQ4a: Where was the placement of newspapers articles about mega-church 
leaders? 
 Stories of mega-church leaders’ scandals were located on the front page more 
than any other section in the paper (n=158, 29%), placement in the front section 
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following closely behind (n=150, 28.2%).  129 (24.2%) stories were placed in the 
local/metro section, while placement of 95 (17.9%) articles could not be determined.   
  RQ4b: Where was the placement of newspapers articles about the Boston Diocese? 
  The majority of the Boston Diocese news stories were also placed on the front 
page (n= 205, 57.4%), while 130 (36.4%) were placed in the front section and 6.2 %, 
n=22 were located in the local/metro section.   
Table 12 
Religious leader articles by newspaper placement 
 
Leader 
 
Front Page 
 
Front Section 
 
Local/Metro 
Section 
 
Undetermined 
 
Bakker 
 
37 
 
24 
 
20 
 
27 
Haggard 21 24 24 0 
Long 7 3 32 13 
Lyons 9 14 5 54 
Swaggart 84 85 48 1 
Boston Diocese 205 130 22 0 
  
 RQ 4c:  Is there a difference between the placement of mega-church leader and 
 Boston Diocese articles? 
 A significant association was found between newspaper placement and religious 
leaders, !!(3, n=1316)=149.67, p <.01.   
 RQ5a:  How were mega-church leaders portrayed in newspaper items? 
 RQ5b:  How was the Boston Diocese portrayed in newspaper items? 
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 Mega-church leaders portrayals were balanced 719 (84.4%) times in the first six 
months after the scandal, while the Boston Diocese portrayals were balanced light 383 
(82.5%) times.  The mega-church leaders were seen negatively 118 times (13.8  %), 
while the Boston Diocese were found to have 77 (16.6%) occurrences of negative 
newspaper portrayals. The leaders were rarely portrayed positively (n=15, 1.8% for 
mega-church leaders and 3, (.6%) for the Boston Diocese.  See Table 13 for detailed 
results. 
Table 13 
 Religious Leaders by Portrayal 
 
Leader  
 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Balanced 
 
Bakker 
 
1 
 
21 
 
92 
Haggard 6 20 116 
Long 1 10 45 
Lyons 3 48 225 
Swaggart 4 19 241 
Boston Diocese 3 77 383 
 
 RQ5c:  Is there a difference in the way the mega-church leaders and the Boston 
 Diocese were portrayed in newspaper items? 
 A significant association was not found between the portrayal of mega-church 
leaders and the Boston Diocese. 
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 RQ6a:  What is the overall tone of newspaper items about mega-church leaders 
and the Boston Diocese? 
 RQ6b:  What is the overall tone of newspaper items about the Boston Diocese? 
 The overall tone of the item was coded as positive, negative or balanced. For 
mega-church leaders, 776 (91.1%) items were balanced, while 61 (7.2%) were negative 
and 15 (1.8%) were positive.  The Boston Diocese newspaper items were 
overwhelmingly balanced in tone (n=454, 97.6%), followed by 8 (1.7%) negative items 
and 2 (.4%) positive items. 
 RQ6c:  Is there a difference between the tone of newspaper items about mega-
 church leaders and the Boston Diocese?  
 A significant association was revealed between the tone of newspaper items about 
mega-church leaders and the Boston Diocese   !!(3, n=1316)=24.25, p<.01. 
Table 14 
Religious Leaders by Item tone 
 
Leader 
 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Balanced 
 
Bakker 
 
1 
 
10 
 
103 
Haggard 5 18 119 
Long 1 8 47 
Lyons 5 19 252 
Swaggart 3 6 255 
Boston Diocese 2 8 453 
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 RQ7a:  How were newspaper items about the mega-church leaders and Boston 
 diocese framed? 
 The overwhelming majority of the news stories written about mega-church 
leaders were framed as conflicts (n=477, 56.0 %), followed by the morality frame 
(n=112, 13.1%).  The economic frame was found in 84 articles (9.9%) and 76(8.9%) of 
the articles were considered to be human interest.  The human-interest frame was used 
often to offer the victims’ account of the scandal.  For example, in an article about the 
Boston Diocese, a former alter boy intricately described the impact of sexual abuse on his 
life  (Richard, 2002). 
 RQ7b:  How were newspaper items about the Boston diocese framed? 
 Articles on the Boston Diocese also garnered a majority conflict frame (n=286, 
61.6%) followed by human-interest frames (n=40, 8.6%).  8.2% (n=38) of the articles had 
a moral frame and 6.3% (n=29) held an economic frame.  
 RQ7c:  Is there a difference between the news frames of mega-church leaders and 
 the Boston Diocese? 
 A significant relationship between news frames and religious leaders was found, !!(4, n=1316)=15.01, p=.005 
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Table 15 
Religious Leaders by news frames 
 
Name 
 
Human 
Interest 
 
Conflict 
Frame 
 
Morality 
Frame 
 
Economic 
Frame 
 
Attribution of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Bakker 
 
5 
 
67 
 
11 
 
17 
 
14 
Haggard 20 59 36 6 21 
Long 2 32 11 7 4 
Lyons 21 158 31 19 47 
 
Swaggart 
 
28 
 
161 
 
23 
 
35 
 
17 
Boston 
Diocese 
 
40 286 38 29 71 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This study aimed to determine the different strategies, stances and factors 
associated with religious leaders in crises.  It also examined whether there was a 
difference in the strategies, stance, and factors between mega-church leaders and the 
Boston Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, and whether their responses were 
received favorably.  The results of the analysis provide insight into theoretical and 
practical implications of religious leaders’ crisis communication strategies. While it was 
proven that there was only a significant difference between the image restoration 
strategies employed by mega-church leaders and the Boston Diocese of the Roman 
Catholic Church, the findings do suggest strong relationships in audience reception of 
these strategies.   
 The first set of research questions explored crisis responses.  The findings of the 
study lend support to Seeger et al., (2001) research of the effectiveness of post crises 
responses. The results found that both groups (mega-church leaders and the Boston 
Diocese) utilized a single spokesperson (the leader himself) more frequently than not.  
This is vital to the success of crisis communication, because this type of consistency took 
place before the crises occurred.  Religious leaders, be it senior pastors, bishops or priests 
are the designated spokespersons for their respective institutions.  Internal and external 
audiences expect to and do hear from the congregation’s leader when major issues arise, 
and post-crises communication is no exception. This finding directly supports Seeger et 
al.’s (2001) claim that the role of “communicating to multiple audiences with a single, 
unified voice…typically [is] best served by the organization’s CEO” (2001, p. 164).   
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 The findings of this study also echo the findings of Fortunato’s (2008) analysis of 
Duke University’s crisis communication strategies.  University President, Richard 
Brodhead served as the sole spokesperson during and after the crises because he and the 
University’s public relations department found that due to the magnitude of the alleged 
crime, it was necessary that the leader speak on behalf of the college community.  In this 
analysis, the leader was not charged with speaking on behalf of his community, but in 
defense of himself.  This is important to note, because the use of a surrogate speaker 
would imply the leaders’ insincerity and lack of seriousness towards the issue (Brazeal, 
2008). When the leader was not the speaker (30.2% of the total number of occurrences), 
an attorney was found to speak on his behalf.  This was found only in cases where the 
leader was facing litigation.   
 Seeger et al. (2001) posited that audiences demand an immediate and thorough 
response from involved parties despite the fact that crises appear with surprise and 
uncertainty.  In this analysis, the crises were emerging – that is, there was only a matter 
of time before the offenses became public; therefore, the leaders were surprised only by 
the revealing of their actions and not by the actions itself.  This is supported by the 
results, only 6.9% of all communication by the leaders occurred within twenty-four hours 
of the crisis becoming public, and these findings occurred in only three of the six 
individuals analyzed.  Jim Bakker addressed the local newspaper through a spokesperson 
after his scandal became breaking news.  Eddie Long also used a spokesperson as the first 
source of communication to the public twenty-four hours after his alleged actions became 
breaking news.  The lack of prompt communication by religious leaders supports 
Williams and Olaniran’s (1994) contention that organizations that withhold information 
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exacerbate a crisis, and the entire story eventually becomes known. Henry Lyons did 
issue an immediate response to his wife’s arson charge, but failed to explain how his 
actions resulted in her drastic response. Eventually, his affair with two women and 
embezzlement of his organization’s funds became public record.   
 Mega-church leaders were found to have maintained consistent communication 
during the first six months after the crises were made public. The Boston Diocese; 
however, failed to communicate publicly within the first week of the Boston Globe’s 
exposé, but maintained communication after that time.  The delay of the Archdiocese’s 
response could be due to the seriousness of the charges against the Catholic Church and 
ongoing criminal trial against Priest John Geoghan.  The Boston Diocese case included 
both the crisis of child sexual molestation accusations against priests, and the church’s 
supporting treatment of the accused. 
  Mega-church leaders’ communication more often included reducing offensiveness 
more than any other strategy; whereas, the Boston Diocese’s communication included a 
majority of mortification.  Bolstering and attacking the accuser were two strategies under 
the reducing offensiveness category that were used by mega-church leaders.  Each leader 
bolstered their image based on their previous favorable characteristics.  Blaney et al., 
(2002) also found bolstering was a reasonable choice for Bridgestone-Firestone.  The 
company relied on their product’s longstanding respectable history as a way to remind 
customers of commitment to quality.  Similarly, mega-church leaders reminded 
congregations of their steadfast commitment to the ministry.  While addressing his 
congregation, Jimmy Swaggart remarked on his tradition of audacious preaching, “I have 
always tried to be like a man and to preach this gospel exactly as I have seen it without 
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fear or reservation or compromise.” (Kaufman, 1988, p. 36).   Eddie Long identified one 
of his many duties, “So, as a pastor, I want to help everybody,” and Ted Haggard 
bolstered his image by proving he is able to forgive his accuser, “Please forgive my 
accuser. He is revealing the deception and sensuality that was in my life. Those sins, and 
others, need to be dealt with harshly. So, forgive him and, actually, thank God for him” 
(Poole, 2011a, p. 2; Correll, 2009, p. 4).  In Benoit’s (1997a) initial identification of 
image repair strategies, he argued that bolstering is used to “strengthen the audience’s 
positive feelings toward the offender, in effort to offset negative feelings with the 
wrongful act” (p. 180).   
 The Boston Diocese’s use of mortification may be attributed to their delayed 
response time and the seriousness of the offenses.  The Boston Diocese responded to 
media one week after the local newspaper began a revealing investigative reporting series 
on its accused priests and its negligent response to accusations.   In his first 
communication, Cardinal Bernard Law exhibited mortification to the families and victims 
of sexual abuse by priests, “To victims and their families, I offer my profound apology, 
and I also hope that the church's evolving response to that problem might offer some 
measure of comfort” (Dunne, 2004, p. 492).  Mortification was necessary for the Boston 
Diocese’s image restoration efforts.  It was also important that his apology appeared 
sincere. Cardinal Law stated that he “profoundly” apologized many times and added that 
he had been “tragically incorrect “ in reassigning several priests after he became aware of 
allegations of sexual misconduct (Dunne, 2004, p. 492).  Law’s apology and admission of 
guilt was in direct contrast to Terrell Owens’ attempt at mortification.  Owens failed to 
accept responsibility for his actions, and offered a vague apology (Brazeal, 2008).  As a 
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result, he was not offered a contract with any National Football League team that year.   
 The initial communication also alluded to the Roman Catholic Church’s 
corrective action strategy.  After offering his apology, Law introduced a zero-tolerance 
policy for “such behavior” and any offenders will be removed from the Archdiocese 
immediately.  Benoit and Henson (2009) found that corrective action was a desirable 
strategy particularly when damage or harm is extensive.  In their analysis of President 
George W. Bush’s response to Hurricane Katrina, corrective action was employed, but 
not directly by the President; therefore, the public negatively received his response.  
Cardinal Law himself enacted the zero-tolerance initiative for the Boston Diocese, 
demonstrating his concern and attempt for the offenses to not be repeated.  His direct 
involvement implies sincerity and compassion, whereas Bush’s response had serious 
limitations.  Bush, as did the Cardinal, had a delayed response to the crisis and did not 
offer any apology.  Because of his lackadaisical attitude during the crisis, he received 
negative criticism from pundits and citizens.  
  Research questions 2-2c investigate stances religious leaders took to respond to 
the crises and if these stances changed over time.  Mega-church leaders’ use of reducing 
offensiveness implies an advocating role.  In fact, the results show that they took a very 
advocating stance more than any other stance.  Jim Bakker, Ted Haggard, Eddie Long, 
and Henry Lyons each denied involvement in their varied wrongdoings.  They further 
advocated their roles by reducing offensiveness of the event.  Eddie Long and Henry 
Lyons attacked their accuser, while all the mega-church leaders bolstered their images.  
The results of the analysis show that the mega-church leaders moved on a continuum 
from pure advocacy to pure accommodation over time (Shin et al., 2005).   For example, 
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Bishop Eddie Long changed his perspective from fighting the accusations to agreeing to 
participate in mediation with his accusers, and Ted Haggard initially denied involvement 
in the offensive acts and later delivered a full apology to his congregation and even asked 
his congregants to pray for his accuser.  
 While the stance of mega-church leaders moved along the continuum, the Boston 
Diocese’s stance was primarily static over time.  Cardinal Bernard Law, speaking on 
behalf of the Diocese and the accused priests, repeatedly apologized for the priests’ 
actions and his negligence.   
 The contingent factors associated with the stances were explored in research 
questions 3-3c.  The results indicate all religious leaders analyzed were influenced by 
external threats as well as political and social environment.  Legal action influenced the 
stances of Jim Bakker, Eddie Long, Henry Lyons, Jimmy Swaggart, and the Boston 
Diocese.  Each of these mega-church leaders was faced with criminal or civil trials; 
therefore, they were possibly cautioned by attorneys to craft messages in effort to be 
favorable in the court of law, and not so much the court of public opinion.   Jimmy 
Swaggart’s external threats were more complicated than the other leader’s because he 
was in the midst of legal troubles when his crisis arose. Swaggart was the defendant in a 
defamation of character suit where Pastor Marvin Gorman accused Swaggart of slander. 
Swaggart’s communication post-crisis was structured to only address the issue and not 
include comments on his legal woes.  The leaders, including Ted Haggard, were 
influenced by litigation and regulation.  Their strategies and stances support Holtzhausen 
and Robert’s (2009) position that “legal or regulatory constraints affect entity” causing  
“it to use less accommodative strategies,” (p. 171).  
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 No significant differences were found between the mega-church leaders and the 
Boston diocese with variables analyzed in research questions one through three.  These 
questions all dealt with the leader’s use of responses, strategies, stances and contingent 
variables.  This finding was not surprising, because although the mega-church leaders 
responded to their individual scandals and Cardinal Law responded on behalf of the 
accused priests, both entities were held responsible for their actions by a waiting public.   
 Preliminary results found that all religious leaders targeted general audiences 
more, and their communication with congregations came in a close second.  It could be 
argued that the general audience was targeted more because of the heightened media 
attention given to the crises.  Media outlets followed each of these cases closely, while 
constantly requesting comments from the leaders.  When congregations were the primary 
audiences, media outlets were still privy to the communications.  It is also important to 
note that religious leaders addressed their congregations in their respective sanctuaries.  
This finding is similar to Oles’s (2010) study of Oprah Winfrey’s crisis response 
strategies.  Oles determined that Winfrey addressed her target audience (viewers) on her 
show because it offered a “safe and controllable forum.”  Just as Winfrey controls the 
production on her set, the leaders have control over the order of service in their 
sanctuaries.  The sanctuary is a venue where the audience developed trust in the leader.  
  The make-up of congregations is also a vital area to discuss in terms of the 
similarity of mega-church leaders and the Boston Diocese’s strategies, stances, and 
contingent variables.  In the mega-church congregation, members are a median age of 
thirty-eight, formally educated and adopters of new ideas (Thumma, 1996).  The 
congregations are diverse and multicultural, with members representing a broad spectrum 
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of countries and speaking several languages (Thumma, 1996).  Miller (1997) noted 
higher participation and giving rates among members of mega-church than those in 
traditional churches.  Members also have an anonymity that traditional members do not 
share.  With an auditorium filled with thousands of other worshipers, it is easy to be 
looked upon as a “passive viewer seeking an intense but private religious experience” 
(Robinson, 1991, as cited in Thumma, 1996, p. 89).  To a certain degree, Catholic Church 
parishioners also have access to private religious experiences in the church with 
confessions and communion, but that is where the similarities end between the two 
groups.  Catholics seek a structured format based on long historical development of forms 
of worship and liturgy (Avella, 2011).   New adult members entering the Church are 
required to go through a process that entails study, prayer and rites of passage.  The 
Catholic membership is economically, ethnically and culturally diverse, with parishes 
located all over the world.   
 Both groups view their leader as their shepherd, one who will teach the Gospel 
and foster their spiritual development (Gibson, 2003, p. 83). In practice, both are 
concerned with mortal existence and prosperity as well.  It is imperative that the leader 
address his members separate from the general population, because it is the members who 
donate time, energy and money for causes the leader adopts. 
 Research question four analyzes whether media coverage of the scandals gave the 
issues salience.   In terms of placement, the majority of newspaper articles were placed 
on the front page, indicating salience of the issue on the local and national platform. 
National news coverage also gives testament to the prominence of mega-church leaders 
and the Roman Catholic Church. The story placement is also important in determining 
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audience reception.  According to Holtzhausen and Roberts (2009) visibility is best 
achieved when stories are placed in the front pages of the interior sections; therefore, the 
religious leaders’ garnered high visibility on the front pages of papers. There was a 
significant difference in the amount of local newspaper front-page stories between the 
two groups.  The Boston Diocese received considerable more attention mainly due to the 
Boston Globe’s concentrated attention given to the sex abuse scandals.  The salience 
placed on the scandal was magnified and extended because during the six-month period 
analyzed, several other allegations against priests were made public.   
 Research questions five and six identified how the individual leaders were 
portrayed in newspaper items, as well as the overall tone of the item.  An overwhelming 
majority of the newspaper items featured balanced portrayals of the leaders.  Haskell 
(2007) notes that balanced news portrayals “place events in perspective by providing 
relevant background,” (p. 124).   It is important to note, however, that the majority of 
letters to the editor depicted a negative image of the leaders.  This suggests that the 
audience does not always subscribe to media portrayals. Readers described leaders as 
“horrendous”, “monster” and “evil.”   One columnist wrote that Henry Lyons violated 
“the sacred bond” between the leader and its members, and identified him as “lying 
Lyons” (Singletary, 1997, p. H01).   
  The overall tone of the newspaper items was also overwhelmingly balanced. 
While the majority of the news articles shared balanced leader portrayals and overall 
balance, the balance in several columns and letter to the editor were unparalleled.  One 
letter to the editor admonished the media and Jim Bakker’s accusers for its coverage and 
attack on Bakker, while barely mentioning Bakker.  Another letter to the editor berated 
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Priest John Geoghan and Cardinal Bernard Law while offering support and 
encouragement to victims.   
 The difference found between the mega-church leaders and the Boston Diocese 
can be attributed to the negative tones identified.  Items concerning the Boston Diocese 
were very rarely identified as negative. This can be due to seriousness of the allegations 
and the legal aspects of the cases.  Many items only offered facts about the cases and 
provided a chronology of events.   
 The last research question sought to identify media frames.   Newspaper items 
framed as conflicts were more prevalent than the other frames.  This finding suggests 
newspapers covered both sides of the crises.  These pieces included initial stories 
informing readers about the crises and subsequent updates.  The morality frame was 
noticed more in columns and letters to the editor other newspaper items. Columnists and 
readers expressed outrage and questioned the leaders’ commitment to the ministry.  
Columnists also were more inclined to frame the story as attribution of responsibility.  
The writers also urged leaders take responsibility for their actions, consistently noted 
their abuse of authority, and urged leaders to seek professional help.  Human interest 
frames were observed more in religious leaders who took advantage of 
innocent/unwilling victims.  The alleged victims of Eddie Long and the priests of the 
Boston Diocese were given attention in local and national papers.  Their identities and 
backgrounds were revealed in effort to give an emotional appeal to the reader and to 
highlight the cases importance.  This finding proves Entman’s (1993) assertion that 
framing makes issues more salient in text. Lastly, the economic frame appeared in cases 
where civil litigation was present.  James Bakker, Eddie Long, Henry Lyons, and the 
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Boston Diocese’s ministries all received coverage that explored the financial aspects of 
their actions.   
  Several scholars have noted the challenges in studying image repair and 
restoration, primarily because determining public opinion is challenging (Holtzhausen & 
Roberts, 2009; Walsh & McAllister-Spooner, 2011).  This is specifically the case for 
religious leaders’ responses to crises.  More than most other organizations, their image is 
the foundation for their multimillion-dollar institutions, and is directly connected to 
financial support from the congregation of followers.  The statistical findings of this 
study serve as a base for qualitative discussion to investigate the effectiveness of the 
individual religious leaders’ total crisis communication campaigns.   
 Jim Bakker consistently shifted the blame to others who he claimed “wickedly 
manipulated” him and “conspired to betray me into a sexual encounter.” (Shepard, 1987, 
p. b02).  While acknowledging that he did participate in the wrongful act, he never 
accepted full responsibility, and bolstered his image.  Bakker responded swiftly and 
balanced communication between his congregation and the general public, but his 
communication strategies were limited due to ongoing legal battles.  After his 
incarceration, Bakker demonstrated corrective action by entering rehabilitation and 
publishing his autobiography.  The book’s volume of sales signified a successful image 
repair campaign, but efforts to restore his image were unsuccessful. 
 Ted Haggard’s chosen target audience served as a foreshadowing of his future 
endeavors. The analysis revealed he addressed his congregation only once, while 
targeting the general public nine times in the six-month period.  After initially denying 
allegations and ultimately apologizing for his actions, Haggard used his crisis as a 
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springboard into pop culture.  He agreed to appear in a cable-televised documentary 
about his life, conducted a media blitz of interviews on national talk shows and appeared 
on reality television shows, all occurring more than three years after the crisis.  It is also 
important to note that Haggard was the only mega-church leader to not directly bolster 
his image.  This omission may have been strategic, since he “acted out” his personality 
on several venues.  While aggressive and highly visible, Haggard’s repair or restoration 
campaigns were not successful. 
 Eddie Long’s image restoration campaign was found to be very advocating more 
often than the other religious leaders, even publically vowing to fight the allegations 
made against him.  His advocating stance was short-lived; however, when he agreed to 
mediation and a monetary settlement.  The success of Long’s image campaign is 
somewhat difficult to evaluate.  After receiving a modest amount of local newspaper 
coverage, compared the exposés of his counterparts, membership in Long’s church 
declined.  The members who remained solidified their support of him by accepting him 
back as senior pastor after a brief break from the ministry.  Long’s image was restored to 
his congregation, and his local general population, but not for a general audience.  
Several public figures in Atlanta bolstered Long’s image during his crisis, which 
reiterates Blaney et al.’s (2002) suggestion that bolstering is effective when used by 
others.  As the most recent case analyzed, Long’s long-term success remains to be seen. 
 Like Jim Bakker, Henry Lyons’ crisis was two-fold: a sexual scandal and 
financial deception.  He vehemently denied involvement and even attacked the media as a 
defense strategy.  Attacking a third party, particularly one as powerful as media, has been 
shown to be an ineffective strategy (Brazeal, 2008).  Public figures are dependent upon 
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media outlets to publicize agendas, and condemning them can lead to a negative working 
relationship.  Due to the criminal accusations, a federal trial uncovered more details of his 
wrongdoings, which led to a guilty verdict.  It was after his trial when Lyons began 
expressing mortification for his actions and consequently attempted to regain the top post 
in his denomination’s regional and national association.  His defeat on both levels proves 
that his image restoration was unsuccessful. 
 Jimmy Swaggart received more national news coverage than any other mega-
church leader analyzed, perhaps due to his high profile among a general audience.  This 
serves as testament to his widespread appeal and is also the result of a crisis he was in the 
process of managing.  Swaggart made only two attempts using repair strategies, which 
possibly fueled the media fire, attesting to Seeger et al.’s (2001) assertion that  silence 
“extends the time that a crisis will remain part of the media agenda” (p. 160).  His crisis 
remained a focus of news stories until he gave his infamous apology.  This tearful plea 
sustained his image with his congregation.  Swaggart also had a tool that effectively 
factored into his restoration campaign – his family.  Son Donnie and grandson Gabriel 
have reached new audiences as well as maintained those cultivated by their patriarch.  Of 
the mega-church leaders analyzed, Swaggart’s efforts were the most successful. 
 The Boston Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church faced the most widespread 
and potentially damaging accusations of the religious leaders.  By concealing knowledge 
and delaying response, the church also added to the mounting quandaries it faced.  The 
Boston Diocese’s overwhelming use of mortification and its sincere attempt to correct the 
problem implied it took a consistent accommodating stance.  Although mortification and 
corrective strategy are known to be successful responses when allegations are perceived 
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as serious, they should be enacted immediately to ensure that many abuse claims be 
avoided (Blaney et al., 2002).  As the mega-church leaders’ personal images are 
interwoven with their church’s images, the Boston diocese shares the image of the 
Roman Catholic Church.  This detail makes the process of restoration extremely 
complicated because other dioceses of the Church have been accused of or found guilty 
or having and proven to have participated in similar behavior.  This widely practiced 
denomination continues to face scrutiny as more victims come forward and more efforts 
of corrective action are implemented. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 Benoit (1997b) used his analysis of actor Hugh Grant’s image restoration 
strategies as a springboard to contrast entertainment image repair with political and 
corporate image repair.  The current study seeks to contrast religious image repair with 
aforementioned image repair categories and encourage more research within 
individualized religious leaders and response strategies.   
 Religious leaders follow the trend of entertainers, politicians, and CEOs in their 
response to crises.  Ironically, each is reluctant to admit their wrongdoings, which is 
necessary for a successful outcome. Religious leaders’ reluctance has been identified in 
cases where legal liability is considered and when it is not.  What ultimately sets religious 
leaders apart from other categories is their primary audience.   
 Public figures rely on a favorable public image for career advancement (Brazeal, 
2008).  If fans do not approve of entertainers’ personal choices, they are likely to 
withdraw support. A CEO’s image affects his company and influences support of his 
dominant coalition.  The company’s board of trustees has the responsibility to align their 
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organization with someone who behaves ethically, and a mishap can serve as grounds for 
termination.  Constituents, too, hold politicians to a high standard.  Elected officials 
campaign to earn the trust and vote of electors, and if an indiscretion becomes public 
knowledge, they are at the serious risk of being removed from office.   
 Religious leaders primary audiences are those who are endeared to them and have 
come to know and trust them.  The leaders influence garners financial, physical and 
emotional support from his congregants and vice versa.  This outpouring assistance is 
something that is not given to entertainers, CEOs, and politicians.  Fans are not likely to 
be in the presence of their favorite entertainer every week; whereas, parishioners are able 
to see their leader in the flesh on a consistent basis.  The board structurally decides upon 
CEO compensation, while parishioners offer several monetary donations to their leader.  
Lastly, politicians receive support from their constituents during campaigns and rarely 
receive the same support when they are not seeking reelection.  Religious leaders seek to 
cultivate parishioner’s support for generations.  With these differences, it is imperative 
that strategy trends involving religious leaders be analyzed separate from other groups.   
 In terms of specific image restoration strategies, the majority of mega-church 
leaders post-crisis communication included several of Benoit’s (1997a) strategies.  The 
most prevalent were bolstering, religious leaders stressing their positive traits and denial, 
outright rejection of any involvement in the unsavory acts.  One can argue that this 
combination of strategies is in sync with one another, as a leader stresses his good 
qualities, it is reasonable to surmise that they would not be involved in scandalous 
activity.  While this combination is complimentary, it should not be used if mortification 
will be used later because it highlights hypocrisy.  As Benoit (1997b) asserts, “when one 
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commits an offensive act, it is often best to employ mortification” (p. 263), and this 
advice should be the initial strategy used.  The importance of time and application of 
repair strategies were related to the success of campaigns.  Had the Boston Diocese 
engaged in communication earlier, their combination of corrective action and 
mortification would have been successful.    
 The contingency theory suggests there are a number of factors that affect an 
organization’s response to crisis.  In this application of contingency theory, it was 
revealed that a majority of external factors were influential in each case.  Previous 
application of contingency theory usually includes two opposing organizations:  
employers versus employees, customers versus businesses, groups for versus groups 
against legislation (Holtzhausen & Roberts, 2009; Shin et al., 2005).  In this study, while 
there are two opposing parties, those parties do not engage in ongoing conflict, rather a 
conflict between the accused and the general audience. This research has proven that 
general audience response, including media attention, has the ability to move religious 
leaders’ stances along the continuum from advocacy to accommodation.  
 This study also confirms Cancel et al.’s (1997) original assertion that the 
excellence model is not always the best choice when practicing crisis communication.  
Two-way symmetrical communication was not an option for the majority of religious 
leaders, particularly because of heightened media attention, coupled with the fact that the 
opposing party is the general public.   Public opinion is varied, and crafting an 
overarching message to reach the masses for its response is a difficult task.  The leaders 
of this study produced responses focusing on their congregation’s needs, and not those 
needs of the general public.   
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Other situational factors not measured in this study could have affected stances 
and strategies, such as the reputation of the religious leaders and previous media biases. If 
the leader received a high volume of media attention that led to the formation of a 
positive or negative reputation, the leader’s response to a crisis could be seen as an 
opportunity to change a negative reputation or crystallize positive reputation.    
 Public relations staffs are growing within religious organizations (Courtright & 
Hearit, 2002; Shin, 2008).  For the religious public relations practitioner, this study offers 
strategies that will likely result in successful crisis communication. While the leader 
usually acted alone in damaging his or her image, the practitioner must be fully equipped 
to assess and advise during the crisis situation.   
 As with any crisis that emerges, it is imperative that there be an immediate 
response, specifically with crises where corrective action will take place. Corrective 
actions offer assurance that the offensive act does not recur, and the sooner it is executed 
the more likely the audience will positively receive it (Blaney, et al., 2002; Len-Rios & 
Benoit, 2004).  While legal advisors may strongly discourage early use of mortification, 
religious leaders must be warned that not doing so will place them on the media agenda 
for a lengthy time.  The cases in this study where legal litigation was a factor resulted in 
guilty verdicts; only afterwards did leaders express mortification.  During their period of 
denial, media and opinion leaders gave full attention to their trial and outcome.  The 
practitioner must also work pre-crisis to maintain the leader’s favorable reputation with 
the primary audience.  In doing so, bolstering attempts will be effectively received. 
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 While the current study has several implications, there were limitations.   
For evaluative purposes, the study did not include reader responses on the Internet.  
Social media pages and other Web 2.0 sites have become important public relations 
resources (Wigley & Zhang, 2011).  Eddie Long was the only leader that used his website 
to address accusations, likely because his was the most recent crisis.  Future research 
should explore how websites and social media are used to address audiences as well as 
how the audience uses the Internet to respond to crises.  Also, the sample time frame 
limited the analysis to six months.  Since the majority of the crises were not resolved in 
that period, the study did not statistically determine how or if religious leaders continued 
to respond to the same crisis beyond the time frame.  The time frame also limited the 
analysis of audience reception.  Audience reception and media frames could have 
changed as more time passed and other items were placed on the media agenda.   
 Future research could examine how news organizations frame religious leaders 
for the duration of the crisis, and if audience reception changes over time.  Other studies 
can determine if there is a difference between general audience and congregational 
reception.  
Conclusion 
 Individuals and organizations must respond to allegations that can potentially 
tarnish public image, whether it is prompt or tardy.  The response must be clearly 
articulated, sincere, and firm to repair and restore images.  This research has 
demonstrated that religious leaders’ responses serve as acknowledgement of the image-
challenging threats, and are the results of several internal and external factors.  The intent 
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of this research is to broaden the study of religious crisis communication by focusing on 
individual religious leaders, their images, and audience reception. 
 Religious leaders – mega-church heads and Roman Catholic priests – are 
synonymous with their institutions.  This delicate and direct relationship causes special 
considerations in their communications campaigns. When executed efficiently, image 
restoration strategies, stances and communication responses can emerge images stronger 
than before. 
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APPENDIX A 
  IMAGE RESTORATION STRATEGIES 
Strateav Key Characteristic Illustration 
Denial   
Simple Denial  
 
Shift the Blame  
Did Not Perform Act  
 
Act Performed by Another  
Tylenol:  did not poison 
capsule 
Tylenol:  a madman 
poisoned capsules 
Evasion of Responsibility   
Provocation  
 
Defeasibility 
 
Accident  
 
Good Intentions 
 
Responded to act of another 
 
Lack of information or 
ability 
Mishap  
 
Meant Well 
Firm moved because of new 
taxes 
Executive not told meeting 
changed 
Tree fell on tracks causing 
train wreck 
Sears wants to provide good 
auto repair 
Reducing Offensiveness of 
Event 
  
Bolstering  
 
Minimization  
Differentiation 
 
Transcendence 
 
Attack Accuser 
 
 
 
Compensation 
 
Stress good traits 
 
Act not serious 
Act less offensive than 
similar acts 
More important values 
 
Reduce credibility of 
accuser 
 
 
Reimburse victim 
 
Exxon’s Swift and 
Competent Action 
Exxon: Few Animals Killed 
Sears: Preventative 
Maintenance, not fraud 
Helping humans justifies 
testing animals 
Coke:  Pepsi owns 
restaurants, competes 
directly with you for 
customers 
Disabled movie goers given 
free passes after denied 
access 
 
Corrective Action Plan to Solve or Prevent 
Problem 
AT&T long distance 
upgrades 
Mortification  Apologize for Act AT&T apologized for 
service interruption 
 
Benoit, 1997a 
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APPENDIX B 
  POTENTIAL VARIABLES FOR CONTINGENCY MODEL OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOMMODATION OF INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL PUBLICS 
EXTERNAL VARIABLES 
Threats 
A. Litigation 
B. Government regulation 
C. Potentially damaging publicity 
D. Scarring of company’s reputation in business community and in the general 
public 
E. Legitimizing activists’ claims 
Industry environment 
A. Changing dynamic or static 
B. # of competitors/level of competition 
C. Richness or leanness of resources in the environment 
General political/social environment/external culture (level of uncertainty) 
A. Degree of political support of business 
B. Degree of social support of business 
The External Public (Group, Individual, etc) 
A. Size and/or number of members 
B. Degree of source credibility/powerful members or connections 
C. Past successes or failures of groups to evoke change 
D. Amount of advocacy practiced by organization 
E. Level of commitment/involvement by members 
F. Whether the group has public relations counselors or not 
G. Public’s perception of group:  reasonable or radical 
H. Level of media coverage the public has received in past 
I. Whether representatives of the public know or like representatives of the 
organization 
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J. Whether representatives of the organization know or like representatives from the 
public 
K. Public’s willingness to dilute its cause/request/claim 
L. Moves and countermoves 
M. Relative power of organization 
N. Relative power of public 
Issue Under Question 
A. Size 
B. Stakes 
C. Complexity 
INTERNAL VARIABLES 
Corporation Characteristics 
A. Open or closed culture 
B. Dispersed widely geographically or centralized 
C. Level of technology the corporation uses to produce its product or 
serve/complexity of products and/or services 
D. Homogeneity or heterogeneity of employees 
E. Age of corporation/value placed on tradition 
F. Speed of growth in the knowledge level the corporation uses 
G. Economic stability of the organization 
H. Existence or nonexistence of issues management personnel or program 
I. Corporation’s past experiences with conflicting outside organizations 
J. Distribution of decision-making power 
K. Formalization:  Number of rules or codes defining and limiting the job 
descriptions of employees 
L. Stratification/hierarchy of positions 
M. Existence or influence of corporation legal department 
N. Business exposure (product mix and customer mix) 
O. Corporate Culture 
Public Relations Department Characteristics 
A. Total number of practitioners and number with college degrees 
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B. Type of past training of employees 
C. Location of public relations department in corporate hierarchy 
D. Representation in dominant coalition 
E. Experience level of public relations practitioners in dealing with conflict 
F. General communication competency of department 
G. Autonomy of department 
H. Physical placement of department in corporate building 
I. Staff trained in research methods 
J. Amount of funding available for dealing with external publics 
K. Amount of time allowed to use dealing with external publics 
L. Gender:  percentage of upper-level staff female 
M. Potential of department to practice various models of public relations 
Characteristics of dominant coalition (top management) 
A. Political values 
B. Management style 
C. General altruism level 
D. Support and understanding of public relations 
E. Frequency of external contact with publics 
F. Their perception of the organization’s external environment 
G. Their calculation of potential rewards or losses of using different strategies with 
external publics 
H. Degree of line-manager involvement in external affairs 
Internal Threats 
A. Economic loss 
B. Marring of employees’ or stockholders’ perception of the company 
C. Marring of the personal reputations of the company decision makers 
Individual Characteristics 
A. Training in public relations, marketing, journalism, and so on 
B. Personal ethics 
C. Tolerance or ability to deal with uncertainty 
D. Comfort level with conflict or dissonance 
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E. Comfort level with change 
F. Ability to recognize potential and existing problems 
G. Extent to which their perception of reality is open to innovation 
H. Extent to which they can grasp others’ worldviews 
I. Personality:  dogmatic or authoritarian 
J. Communication competency 
K. Cognitive complexity 
L. Predisposition toward negotiation 
M. Predisposition toward altruism 
N. How they receive, process, and use information and influence 
O. Whether they know or are familiar with external public or their representative 
P. Whether they like external public or their representative 
Q. Gender:  Female vs. male 
Relationship Characteristics 
A. Level of trust between organization and external public 
B. Dependency of parties involved 
C. Ideological barriers between the organization and public 
 
Cancel, Cameron, Sallot and Mitrook, 1997 
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APPENDIX C 
  
RELIGIOUS LEADER TACTICS, FACTORS AND STANCES CODE BOOK 
 
1)  Religious Leader Name – Person giving message or person message about 
1-  James Bakker  
2- Ted Haggard 
3- Eddie Long 
4-Henry Lyons 
5- Jimmy Swaggart 
6- Boston Archdiocese 
 
2)  Date – date message posted, aired, published 
1 – 24 hours after    5-   8-13 days after 
2- 48 hours after   6-   2 weeks after 
3- 72 hours after   7-   3-6 weeks after 
4- 73 hours- 1 week after  8 –  more than 6 weeks after 
 
3)  Indicate item type –  
1- press conference statement- prepared statement given at press conference 
2- sermon – speech given inside church/institution to present audience(congregation) 
3 – media interview 
 3.1 – newspaper – answers to questions published by newspaper 
  3.11 – national – newspaper with national circulation 
  3.12– local- newspaper with circulation limited to area near scandal 
 3.2 – television- answers to questions aired on television 
  3.21 – national – major television network 
  3.22 – local – television station serving local area only 
 3.3 – radio – answers to questions aired on radio 
  3.31 – national 
  3.32 - local 
4 – news release- statement released by religious leader 
5 – website message – message written by religious leader, posted on institution or 
religious leader webpage 
6- Legal proceedings 
 
4)If item is newspaper article, indicate placement  
0- Undetermined 
1- Front page 
2- Front Section (Section A) 
3 – Local/Metro Section 
 
 
5)  Is leader primary speaker? – Is the leader (the accused) is spokesperson or is 
someone speaking on behalf of the religious leader 
1- yes 
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2- no 
 
6)  Indicate primary audience –  to whom religious leader directly sends message 
1- public officials – elected officials, law enforcement 
2- general audience – no audience is specified 
3- congregation – religious leader’s own church audience 
4 - other 
 
7.  Image repair strategy and usage – Indicate which image repair strategy was used  
1- denial – religious leader states that he did not perform the act 
 - shifting the blame – religious leader states the act was performed by  
 someone other than himself 
2.  Evasion of responsibility 
  – provocation- religious leader states he was responding to the act or action 
 of someone other than himself 
 – defeasibility – religious leader states that he was not informed that the act 
 was immoral 
 - accident- religious leader states that the act was unintentional 
  – good intentions – religious leader states that he meant well when 
 performing the act 
3.  Reducing offensiveness of event  
 - bolstering – religious leaders states his good/positive traits 
 – minimization – religious leader contends that the act was not serious 
 -differentiation – religious leader contends the act was less offensive that  others 
believe 
 - transcendence – religious leader contends that there are more important 
 considerations that deserve focus 
 - attack accuser – religious leader reduces credibility of the accuser 
 - compensation – religious leader states he will reimburse victim or give  them 
monetary settlement or item states that religious leader will reimburse  victim or give 
he or she monetary settlement 
4.  Corrective action – religious leaders states he sill plan to solve or prevent the problem 
from occurring again 
  
5. Mortification – religious leader apologizes for act and asks for forgiveness 
 
6.  unknown- unclear, cannot be determined 
  
  
 Indicate external Variables 
Threats 
8- Litigation – is religious leader facing lawsuits, arrest or jail time 
1- yes 
2 – no 
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9- Government regulation – is religious leader facing reprimand or punishment from 
denomination or assembly? 
1- yes 
2- no 
 
10- Potentially damaging publicity 
1-yes 
2- no 
 
11- Scarring of company’s reputation in business community and in the general 
public 
1 – yes 
2- no 
 
12- Legitimizing activists’ claims- religious leader acknowledges the alleged victims 
claims 
1- yes 
2-no 
 
13) Degree of political support of business – religious leader’s support from public 
officials 
1 – strong support (religious leader active in political issues, ie. Supports/endorses 
candidates, hosts fundraisers, participates in rallies, protests) 
2- moderate support (religious leader moderately active in political issues, ie, supports 
political process) 
3- no support – no evidence of political support  
 
14)  Degree of social support of business – religious leader’s support of 
individuals/groups excluding congregations and public officials 
1-  Strong support 
2- moderate support 
3 – no support 
 
15)  Stance – does the speaker seem to accommodate his public or serve as an advocate 
for himself 
    1- Very accommodating 
            2- Accommodating  
 3- Neutral  
 4- Advocating  
 5 - Very advocating 
 6- Unclear 
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APPENDIX D  
 
EVALUATIVE CODESHEET  
 
(FOR USE ON EDITORIALS AND COLUMNS) 
 
1)  Religious Leader Name  
1-  James Bakker  
2- Ted Haggard 
3- Eddie Long 
4-Henry Lyons 
5- Jimmy Swaggart 
6- Boston Archdiocese 
 
2)  Date  - 
1 – 24 hours after    5-   8-13 days after 
2- 48 hours after   6-   2 weeks after 
3- 72 hours after   7-   3-6 weeks after 
4- 73 hours- 1 week after  8 –  more than 6 weeks after 
 
3)  Item type –  
1- Column 
2- news article 
3- letter to editor 
4- online comment 
5- editorial 
 
4) If item is newspaper article, indicate placement  
0- Undetermined 
1- Front page 
2- Front Section (Section A) 
3 – Local/Metro Section 
 
5)  Local or National Newspaper 
1- National 
2- Local 
 
6)  Select the dominant news frame present in the piece -  
1. Human interest frame: Places a human face or an emotional 
representation of a story. 
2. Conflict frame: Used to reflect conflicts between individuals, groups 
and organizations. 
3. Morality frame: Puts the event in context of morals, social and 
religious tenets. 
4. Economic frame: Reports an event in relation to the consequences it 
will have economically on an individual or organizational level. 
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5. Attribution of responsibility frame: Attributes responsibility of an 
event to an individual, group, organization or country. 
 
 
7.  Indicate whether item casts the mega-church leader/Boston diocese in an overall 
positive, negative, or balanced light 
1- positive 
2- negative 
3 – balanced 
 
8.  Is the overall tone of the story dominantly: 
1. Positive tone 
2. Negative tone 
3. Neutral tone 
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